CHAPTER VII. THE ANTINOMY OF THE NOT-ME.
E have reached, it will be remembered, this proposition: The I posits the Me and the Not-me as determining each the other.
This involves two distinct propositions, namely:
I. The I posits the Me as determining the Not-me.
II. The I posits the Not-me as determining the Me.
These propositions, which, as we have just seen, express simply the most ordinary facts of consciousness, furnish the foundation of the whole system which we are studying.
The first furnishes the foundation for the practical part of the system. No use can at present be made of it. We do not yet know whether it is or is not absolutely true. It may be that we shall find the Not-me to be a limitation which the I puts upon itself. When we have found the reality of the Not-me, if indeed we find such reality, we can make use of this proposition. Till then, it must be left unused.
We turn, then, to the second proposition, namely: The I posits the Me as determined by the Not-me. This forms the basis of the theoretical part of the system, and we can make use of it at once.
The I posits the Me as determined, or limited, by the Not-me. This is the proposition from which we must now take our start. Doing this, we must keep in mind the method which is followed throughout by the system that we are studying. The method is to discover by analysis the contradictions that are involved in any given proposition, and then to seek to reconcile these by a synthesis.
The proposition under consideration involves contradictions. These may become apparent through a difference in emphasis. We may say: The I posits the Me, as determined by the Not-me; or we may say: The I posits the Me as determined by the Not-me.
The first of these statements affirms that the Me is limited by something that is not itself. The I appears to be not all; but to be conditioned by that which is external.
The second form of emphasis affirms the absoluteness of the I. It posits the Me as determined by the Not-me; and whatever the I posits, it posits in its own consciousness. In consciousness, the I is the only actor. As we have seen, it is the result of its own positing of itself. It is by self-consciousness that it becomes an I. Whatever is found in consciousness is thus the result of its activity. To say, therefore, that the I posits the Me as determined by the Not-me, is simply to say that the I determines itself.
We have thus deduced from the general proposition, The I posits itself as determined by the Not-me, these two subordinate propositions, namely:
The Not-me determines the Me.
The I determines itself.
From one of these, as we shall find, is developed the Category of Causality; and from the other, that of Substantiality. These two Categories, at first, will seem to be wholly antithetical to one another, and will represent the elements of the antinomy contained in our general proposition.
It may now be well to translate the terms of this antinomy into the language of our common life, and thus to show that they involve no merely seeming difficulty artfully conjured up by a process of dialectics in order that it may be removed by another process, but a difficulty that we must all feel to be involved in every act of consciousness. I find myself in a world of objects, by many of which I am affected. Some limit me painfully, invading my life or checking my activities. Others affect me pleasantly; but they affect me, none the less. At every moment, my inner life is determined by them. I have no doubt of their reality. Never, for a moment, can I separate myself from them, so far as my consciousness is concerned. I seem to be conscious of them as I am conscious of myself. When, however, I think carefully of the matter, this very fact that I seem to be conscious of them suggests a grave difficulty. I can really be conscious only of myself. I can prove that the elements that make up this world of objects are thoughts and sensations of my own. I cannot escape from the world of my own consciousness. Yet, no matter how clearly I may prove this, the world of objects remains, for me, a world that is foreign to myself. I can prove it to be the Me; I can not think of it except as the Not-me. To put the difficulty into a somewhat different form: If these objects are outside of my consciousness how did they ever get into it? or, if they are in my consciousness, how did they ever get out of it? We have, here, the problem, the solution of which Fichte is to attempt; and at this point his system properly begins.