If chapter 448 is constitutional, it limitation attached some years before this action was commenced. It was held constitutional by this court in Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 42 L. ed. 392, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38. The contention now is, however, that our conclusion depended upon reasoning not applicable to the case at bar. It is said that to the validity of a statute of limitations a remedy precedent to and during the period of limitation must exist, and that a remedy did exist we assumed was decided by the state court as a state question, and that on a writ of error to its judgment we were bound by the ruling, and for that reason affirmed the judgment. But the pending case being on error to a United States court, we not only may, but must, exercise an independent judgment-decide for ourselves, not follow the state court, whether a remedy existed.
But was the conclusion in the Turner Case as dependant as contended? The question is best answered by the case itself.
The action was brought in the state court, and was replevin for logs cut upon wild forest lands. The state claimed title through sales for delinquent taxes and deeds executed in pursuance of them. The defendant attacked the deeds, alleging the invalidity of the taxes for 1867 and 1870, and offered evidence to show that the oath of the assessors to the assessment roll of 1867 was taken on August 10, instead of on the third Tuesday of August; and that the assessors omitted to meet on the third Tuesday to review the assessment for that year.
The state objected to the evidence as immaterial because the comptroller's deed was made conclusive evidence of those matters by the statute of the state of 1885, chap. 448,-the statute now in controversy. To the objection it was replied that the statute infringed the 1st section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The state's objection, however, was sustained, and judgment was directed and entered for the state, which was affirmed by the court of appeals, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400.
Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of this court. He stated the law of 1885 establishing a forest preserve and the creation of a forest commission and its duties, and that at the date of the passage of the statute the time for redemption from tax sales was two years. He then stated the enactment and provisions of the law whose constitutionality was attacked, the time of the tax sales, the time for redemption and its expiration, the period the comptroller's deeds were on record, and the time that they became conclusive, and said:
'The statute according to its principal intent and effect, and as construed by the court of appeals of the state, was a statute of limitations. People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E. 1022; People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400. It is well settled that a statute shortening the period of limitation is within the constitutional power of the legislature, provided a reasonable time, taking into consideration the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632, 633, 24 L. ed. 365, 366; Re Brown, 135 U.S. 701, 705-707, 34 L. ed. 316-318, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972.
'The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed to the state for non-payment of taxes; it applies to those cases only in which the conveyance has been of record for two years in the office where all conveyances of lands within the county are recorded, and it does not bar any action begun within six months after its passage. Independently of the consideration that before the passage of the statute the plaintiff had had eight years since the sale and three years since the recording of the deed, during which he might have asserted his title, this court concurs with the highest court of the state in the opinion that the limitation of six months, as applied to a case of this kind, is not repugnant to any provision of the Constitution of the United States.