In any case, the obvious comment on the Monroe Doctrine is that it has indeed protected the American republics from European aggression, but has not protected them from American aggression. It has not protected Peru from Chile nor Mexico and Colombia from the United States. Again, it is a uni-lateral arrangement announced by one Power alone, on the assumption that this action would be taken for granted by the other American republics. This attitude does not entirely commend itself to those states, especially as they grow stronger and more conscious of their strength. American business men plainly assert that the Monroe Doctrine is bad for business[4], and warn their countrymen against straining after a fictitious inter-American sentiment--an attitude which "is often a cause for resentment, the more felt because seldom expressed by the courteous Latin[5]." An article in the Pan-American Bulletin for December 1917 deserves particular attention. It cleaves through the difficulty by declaring, on the authority of Mr Root, that the Monroe Doctrine today means no more than what President Monroe meant a century ago: "The Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of the right of self-defence, that and nothing more. France and Britain are in the field to protect their Monroe Doctrine, the sovereignty and independence of Belgium ... there is nothing here ... in any way derogatory to the full sovereignty and independence of even the smallest of the Latin-American countries. It is true that the first proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine carried with it an implied offer of aid to the newly liberated Spanish-American colonies against proposed aggressions by the Holy Alliance. Self-protection was the motive ... it counts for nothing against a set purpose to defend one's own house that in so doing one performs an act by which one's neighbour is likewise defended." The article concludes by declaring that the Monroe Doctrine still prevails, strictly limited to its original sense, and that Pan-Americanism is an entirely distinct policy, which must not be confused with it.
This re-statement of the Monroe Doctrine in its original terms, this declaration that United States policy is just like that of other nations, was probably prompted by the sense that the later developments of the Monroe Doctrine hindered the economic propaganda which is the main business of the Pan-American Union. But it has been further argued that the great war has exposed the weakness of Monroism, since, in the event of a German victory, nothing but superior force could prevent German invasion and occupation in Canada or in any trans-Atlantic country which might be at war with Germany. The arming of the United States has in some degree answered this objection, which is perhaps as contingent and theoretical as the doctrine itself. But the war has certainly emphasised the fact that emergencies must be met and settled as they arise, and that, since they cannot be foreseen, they cannot be covered by pre-conceived theories. At any rate a sentiment has for some time been gaining force that the inter-American policy of the United States calls for some kind of revision or re-statement; and the solution is sought in "Pan-Americanism."