All this show of analysis amounts only to what every logical student knows, that in every proposition the copula, or the verb _to be_, denotes not the existence of the subject, but its relation to the predicate. There was no need of so many words to tell us so simple a thing, nor of such affected efforts of the understanding in treating of an identical proposition. But let us arm ourselves with patience, and continue to listen to the German philosopher:
"But to return to A itself, _whether_ A is or not; nothing is as yet affirmed thereon. The question then occurs: under what condition is A?
"X at least is supposed _in_ and _by_ the _me_, for it is the _me_ which judges in the above proposition, and indeed judges by X as by a law, which consequently being given to the _me_, and by it established absolutely and without other foundation, must therefore be given to the _me_ by the _me_ itself."
82. What does all this Sanscrit mean? We will translate it into English: in identical or equivalent propositions there is a relation which the mind knows, judges, and according to which it decides upon the rest: this relation is given to our mind; identical propositions need no proof in order to obtain assent. All this is very true, very clear, and very simple; but, when Fichte adds that this relation must be given to the _me_ by the _me_ itself, he asserts what he neither does nor can know. Who told him that objective truths come to us from ourselves? Is one of the principal philosophical questions, such as is that of the origin of truth, to be thus easily solved with a dash of the pen? Has he, perchance, defined his _me_, or given us any idea of it? Either his words mean nothing, or they mean this: I judge of a relation; this judgment is in me; this relation, as known and abstracted from real existence, is in me; all which may be reduced to Descartes' more natural and simple expression: "I think, therefore I exist."
83. Upon carefully examining Fichte's words, we clearly see that he made no more progress than the French philosopher. He goes on: "_Whether_ and _how_ A in general is supposed, we know not; but as X must mark a relation between an unknown supposition of A and an absolute supposition of A under the condition of this supposition, in so far at least as that relation is supposed, A exists _in_ the _me_, and is supposed _by_ the _me_, just as X. X is possible only in relation to an A: but X is really supposed in the _me_, therefore A also must be supposed in the _me_ in so far as X is referred to it."