'Under our system of government, no officer is placed above the restraining authority of the law, which is truly said to be universal in its behests, all paying it homage, the least as feeling its care, and the greatest as not being exempt from its power.'

If the chief executive officer of a State is liable to be controlled by the courts of the State in the discharge of ministerial duties, for much stronger reasons is the chief executive officer of the United States liable to be controlled by this court under the provisions of the Federal Constitution. In Greene v. Mumford, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island said, in regard to officers:

Mississippi v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court

'If they are departing from the power which the law has vested in them, if they are assuming to themselves a power over property which the law does not give them, this court no longer considers them as acting under their commission, but treats them as individuals.'

Mississippi v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court

By the same principle, the President, when acting in opposition to the Federal Constitution, may be treated as an individual.

Mississippi v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court

II. Does the bill present a case proper for the interposition of this court? [The learned counsel then went fully into this point, enlarging upon and enforcing, by argument and authority, the positions set forth in the bill itself.]

It is manifest here that the case made against Andrew Johnson is not made against him as an individual, as a natural person, for any acts that he intends to do as Andrew Johnson the man, but altogether in his official capacity as President of the United States. The evil complained of, so far as he is concerned, is in the execution of what he considers to be his official duty (as they say, notwithstanding his vetoes), to execute certain acts of Congress by appointing the necessary officers. By his seeing to the execution of those laws the mishief ensues of which they complain; and, therefore, they ask this court to make him a party defenant; they ask this court to submit him, as President, to the process of subpoena; to compel his attendance; to bring him, as President, within the power of this court; and to compel him, by the power which a court of equity possesses to enforce its decrees, to do that, in regard to these laws, which this court may deem to be proper.

The opposing counsel admit that this is a case of the first impression; that they have no precedent for such a bill; but they have certain analogies, they think, under which this court will find power to bring the President here, and make him perform the behests of this court. It will be observed that there is no allegation that the President is about to do anything of his own motion, which, as President, he is not authorized to do. The allegation is, that he is about to execute certain laws passed by Congress; that he considers it his duty to execute those laws; but that this court is a better judge of his duty as President than the President himself; and that when he seeks to execute a law, and to avoid impeachment and denouncement as unfaithful to his duty as Executive, this court is to interfere and tell him what his duty is in the premises, and compel him to perform it.