[273] Act of April 1: _Laws_ (1872), chap. 272, p. 445.
[274] The _Code of Md._ (1888) seems to be entirely silent as to remarriage.
[275] _Comp. Stat. of D. C._ (1894), 275 ff., allowing entire freedom; superseded by the act of 1901: MOORE, _Code_ (1902), 199, 200.
Formerly the law of North Carolina was stringent in this regard. The act of 1814 permits the "complainant or innocent person" to "marry again as if he or she had never been married;" leaving us to infer, perhaps, that the defendant was not allowed such liberty.[276] In 1828 it is squarely enacted that "no defendant or party offending, who shall be divorced from the bonds of matrimony ... shall ever be permitted to marry again."[277] This rule stands in sharp contrast with the policy of the later law. First the prohibition was restricted to the lifetime of the aggrieved.[278] Next, in 1869, the term was reduced to two years.[279] From 1871 to 1895 no check whatever was put upon the further marriage of either spouse, whether guilty or innocent;[280] but now in case of wilful desertion the guilty defendant may not rewed in five years, or during the lifetime of the plaintiff, if divorced for the eighth cause above considered.
[276] _Laws_ (1814), chap. 5; and HAYWOOD, _Manual_ (1819), 176. The same provision appears in _Laws of the State of N. C._ (1821), II, 1294.
[278] _Rev. Code_ (1855), chap. 39, sec. 17, p. 254.
[279] Act of April 7, 1869: _Pub. Laws_, 323.
[280] All restriction is removed by _Laws_ (1870-71), chap. 193, sec. 46, p. 343; also in _Code of N. C._ (1883), I, 518.
The Georgia statute approved in 1806 allows remarriage when a contract is nullified under the principles of ecclesiastical law; but denies the privilege to the person whose "improper or criminal conduct" is the cause of an absolute divorce, so long as the innocent consort lives.[281] This rule long remained in force;[282] but under the existing code a rather peculiar procedure is adopted. The jury according to whose final verdict a decree of absolute divorce is granted determines the rights and disabilities of the parties, including the question of remarriage, subject to the revision of the court; but provision is made for subsequent removal of the disabilities thus imposed. On proper application, notice of which must be published in a newspaper for sixty days, with twenty days' personal notification to the other divorced person if still living and residing in the county, the question of granting relief is submitted to a new jury, "who shall hear all the facts, and if, in their judgment, the interest of the applicant or of society demands the removal of such disabilities," shall so find; and the person relieved shall then be allowed to form a second marriage as if no former contract had ever existed. At the trial the divorced person or any citizen of the county may resist the application; but should no person appear for this purpose, then "the solicitor-general shall represent the state, with full power to resist the same, as in ordinary divorce cases."[283]