The Singapore government rolled out the TraceTogether app for its contact tracing initiative. Screenshot from GovSG video. Photo from EngageMedia This edited article by Dr. James Gomez was originally published by EngageMedia, a non-profit media, technology, and culture organization, and an edited version is republished here as part of a content-sharing agreement with Global Voices. This is part of a series that focuses on the lasting impact of the COVID-19 crisis on digital rights and tells the continuing story of digital authoritarianism in the Asia Pacific. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Singapore government strongly pushed forward its use of surveillance technology. The government promoted tracking applications and other monitoring tools as a leading solution to the health crisis. This article argues that the government used COVID-19 to legitimise the extension of surveillance infrastructure. Using health risk concerns, the government was able to — without facing any resistance — get its citizens under the ambit of digital authoritarianism. Even before the pandemic, Singapore was moving towards being a surveillance state, devoting a significant amount of its resources to improving its monitoring capability. As of May 2023, there were a little over 109,000 CCTV cameras in the city-state, which amounts to nearly 18 cameras per 1,000 people. The island also has at least 20,000 public Wireless@SG hotspots. Wireless@SG is operated by internet service providers (ISPs), which are majority-owned by the government. These ISPs have been reported to give away personal information of their users to the government. Apart from these tools, which provide lawful mechanisms for obtaining information and data from people living in the country, the Singapore government has acquired and used state-of-the-art spyware against critics of the ruling People's Action Party administration. The country’s law enforcement agencies have “extensive networks for gathering information and conducting surveillance and highly sophisticated capabilities to monitor […] digital communications intended to remain private.” These capacities were utilised against government critics and political activists, as revealed by reports and leaked documents. For example, in 2021, the government reportedly attempted to use spyware to hack into the Facebook accounts of two Singaporean journalists whose pieces are often critical of the government. The use of surveillance tools, whether their use is legal or not, is enabled or facilitated through legal provisions and loopholes. At the government’s disposal are the Cybersecurity Act, Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, and the Infectious Disease Act. They contain vague and subjective definitions of key terms. To name one example, the High Court, in the case, Chee Siok Chin and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Another, laid out the context of “public order” in which rights may be restricted. The High Court’s interpretation, however, is built upon what is considered the ‘interest’ of public interest and not the maintenance of public order. This gives room for the government to implement intrusive measures against individuals even though such measures may not contribute to the maintenance of public order. Throughout the course of the pandemic, surveillance technology played a crucial role in Singapore’s COVID-19 measures. The government concentrated on subduing the infection rate to the bare minimum by restricting and controlling people’s movement. This was made possible by tracking applications. Applications developed by the government, SafeEntry and TraceTogether, later merged into one under TraceTogether. At the beginning of the pandemic, the use of tracking applications raised questions from the public, who were particularly concerned by the infringement of their privacy. Many people feared that the applications would give away their geo-location and movement, enabling the government to assess their habits and activities. Some were concerned that the government might eavesdrop on phone conversations through these apps. There were fears of the applications being the government’s Trojan horse for spyware to be embedded in their devices. Such concerns were not groundless, given Singapore’s history of state surveillance combined with vague and excessive cyber laws and legal loopholes. However, the government was quick to dismiss such concerns, arguing that TraceTogether operates on Bluetooth technology and uses a “digital handshake” to collect data only when a device comes into proximity with other devices. It does not use GPS technology, which can pinpoint the real-world location of devices, nor does it collect real-time movements.