Final extinction of sorrow (_nibbâna_) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée Poussin has pointed out that in the Pâli texts Nibbâna has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].

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[Footnote 1: See _Kathâvatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp, 221 ff.]

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 — Part 117

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Valláe Poussin's article in the _E. R.E._ on Nirvâ@na. See also _Cullavagga_, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's _Psalms of the early Buddhists_, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; _Dîgha_, II. 15; _Udâna_, VIII.; _Sa@myutta_, III. 109.]

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 — Part 117

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbâna in _Pali Text Society Journal_, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (_âkâsa_) or consciousness (_viññâna_) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbâna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbâna in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathâgata as existing eternally (_s'âs'vata_) or not-existing (_as'âs'vata_) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.