Neither Austria nor the German people had the slightest comprehension of the Minister's deep-laid plans. When he said that the German question could "only be settled by blood and steel," the people construed it as the brutal utterance of despotism. And when it looked as if they might be involved in a war with Austria over this paltry Holstein affair they were stunned, and believed that a desperate man was leading Prussia to her ruin for his own ambitious purposes. What could they with their nineteen millions of people do against Austria, with her fifty millions!
But Bismarck cared not and heeded not. He was too intent upon his game. He knew what no one else seemed to know, that there was no chance for Germany until she was emancipated from Austria.
Again he pushed up his useful little pawn and said "check," but this time to the Emperor of Austria. Ah! here was a game worth watching. Europe and America, too, were willing to let their morning coffee get cold in studying the moves. Francis Joseph did not see as far into the game as his astute adversary, whose keen eye was focused at long range upon a renewed Germany, in which there should be no Austria.
The conflict was short (only seven weeks), but the preparation had been thorough. The 3d of July will long be remembered by Germany. King William was there; the Crown Prince was there, now become "Unser Fritz," by his superb military achievements, the ideal prince and soldier of modern Europe; and Königgrätz, like Waterloo, decided the game. Francis Joseph was checkmated. A galling servitude to Austria existed no more. What wonder that the people were glad, or that Unser Fritz was their idol, and Bismarck became their demigod!
A great physician correctly diagnoses the disease before he treats it. Bismarck knew why the attempts at a German union had been futile. He knew such a union never could exist until Austria was eliminated from it.
An overwhelming revulsion in sentiment followed. The man whom the despotic element had leaned upon became the adored leader of the liberal party. He had no sentimental theories about human rights. His personal tendencies were toward despotism rather than freedom. But he had the acuteness to recognize the advantages which would be derived from a liberal policy and the ardent support of the _people_.