Gentlemen object to the resolution because of the indelicacy of implicating the character of a judge. They seem to believe the character of a judge to be sacred and immaculate. But are not judges men? Are they not men subject to like passions and like feelings as other men? Judges and other official characters voluntarily surrender a part of the rights they enjoyed in common with other citizens, in return for the honors and emoluments of office; others have a right to the privilege of trial by jury, in the decision of all charges against them; but public officers, by accepting of office, subject themselves under this Government, to trial by impeachment. Subjecting judges to impeachment, indicates, unequivocally, a constitutional opinion that judges would be even more liable to transgress than other citizens, and might transgress in a more aggravated manner than mere citizens. This mode of trial, however, in this country, is become almost a harmless thing; it is deprived of more than half its terrors. It does not reach life or property, but only the official character.
Mr. F. said he was a friend to the independence of judges, but that all independence in all Governments had its limits and restraints. It was not provided for the aggrandizement of the judges, but for the protection of the citizens. So far as it is applicable to this purpose, it is necessary, but any further, it is injurious and subjected to restraint. Under no Government with which we are acquainted are the judges rendered so independent as that of the United States. In Britain, from which we have derived the mode of our judiciary, the judges were appointed during pleasure; till, little more than a century ago, they were rendered independent by the Revolution Parliament for the security of the people against the encroachments of the Monarch, and the overbearing influence of a very powerful nobility; and for this purpose it was not only salutary, but absolutely necessary. But even with that boasted independence, that Judiciary is subjected to restraints and modes of correction not provided in the Federal Constitution. The judges are liable to be removed from office by the vote of both Houses of Parliament, without trial. They are liable to be removed, or their standing changed by act of Parliament. That Parliament, on whose act their independence depends, can repeal the act; the two Houses of Parliament can make and unmake their Kings. They are also liable, by an act of attainder, not only to lose their office, but their estate, the honor of their families, and even their lives.
