I think it absolutely necessary that this resolution should not pass. For if it passes, it will establish a precedent that any member may procure an investigating committee to inquire into the conduct of any executive or judicial officer merely upon his opinion, unsupported by facts, that such an inquiry is necessary. Suppose parties to be nearly equally divided; a member has only to propose an inquiry into the conduct of any officer to whom he may feel inimical, and thereby throw a cloud upon his character, and render him the object of suspicion. Thus do I fear that this precedent will furnish the instrument of vengeance of one party against another. The price we pay for our liberties is the existence of parties among us; but it becomes us rather to restrain than to invigorate their passions. If we establish this precedent we shall render impeachment so easy, as greatly to facilitate the means of oppression.
Mr. LOWNDES concluded by saying, that in this affair he threw party considerations entirely out of view. He was personally unacquainted with Judge Chase, and if there was a single affidavit of his misconduct, the appointment of the committee of inquiry should have his vote; but that, under the circumstances attending it, he considered the measure improper in every point of view in which he could consider it.
Mr. FINDLAY observed, that though the abstract right of the members to move for an inquiry into the conduct of public officers, in order to find whether presumptions against their character afforded ground for impeachment, was not expressly denied, yet the manner in which the opposition to the present resolution was conducted was equal to denying the right. He trusted, however, that the House would support this right, as it was one of the most important of any with which they were vested. It grew out of the power of impeachment, and it was necessary for the exercise of that power, and was justified by precedents. By the rules of the House any member has a right to have the doors shut, in order to move such a resolution as he thinks proper. This has been usual in cases of impeachment in Britain, from which we derive the forms of impeachment. There it has been common to shut the doors, and for a member to move for an impeachment of a public officer, and to procure the officer impeached to be taken into custody before there was time or opportunity to take any other testimony than the information stated by the member who moved the resolution, probably supported by public fame. Taking the party into custody was necessary to the circumstances of that country and the extent of punishment, which might not only affect the liberty and property, but even the life of the party found guilty. It was necessary, because of the influence of the powerful nobility, who might have it in their power to stand in their defence; but, as all the penalties in the power of this Government to inflict by impeachment only affect the official trust and character, taking into custody is unnecessary.