Without pretending, in this place, to philosophise upon the origin and the extent of the rights of governments--a vast subject, well calculated to deter me--permit me to submit the following idea to you. It seems to me that the rights of the state can only be the reduction into method of personal rights _previously existing_. I cannot, for myself, conceive _collective right_ which has not its root in _individual right_, and does not presume it. Then, in order to know if the state is legitimately invested with a right, it is incumbent on us to ask whether this right dwells in the individual in virtue of his being and independently of all government.

It is upon this principle that I denied some time ago the right of labour. I said, since Peter has no right to take directly from Paul what Paul has acquired by his labour, there is no better foundation for this pretended right through the intervention of the state: for the state is but the _public authority_ created by Peter and by Paul, at their expense, with a defined and clear object in view, but which never can render that just which is in itself not so. It is with the aid of this touchstone that I test the distinction between property secured and property controlled by the state. Why has the state the right to secure, even by force, every man's property? Because this right exists previously in the individual. No one can deny to individuals the _right of lawful defence_--the right of employing force, if necessary, to repel the injuries directed against their persons, their faculties, and their effects. It is conceived that this individual right, since it resides in all men, can assume the collective form, and justify the employment of public authority. And why has the state no right to _equalize_ or apportion worldly wealth? _Because, in order to do so, it is necessary to rob some in order to gratify others_. Now, as none of the thirty-five millions of Frenchmen have the right to take by force, under the pretence of rendering fortunes more equal, it does not appear how they could invest public authority with this right.

Protection and Communism — Part 19

And remark, that the right of distributing* the wealth of individuals is destructive of the right which secures it. There are the savages. They have not yet formed a government; but each of them possesses the _right of lawful defence_. And it is easy to perceive that it is this right which will become the basis of legitimate public authority. If one of these savages has devoted his time, his strength, his intelligence to make a bow and arrows, and another wishes to take these from him, all the sympathies of the tribe will be on the side of the victim; and if the cause is submitted to the judgment of the elders, the robber will infallibly be condemned. From that there is but one step to the organization of public power. But I ask you--Is the province of this public power, at least its lawful province, to repress the act of him who defends his property in virtue of his abstract right, or the act of him who violates, contrary to that right, the property of another? It would be singular enough if public authority was based, not upon the rights of individuals, but upon their permanent and systematic violation! No; the author of the book before me could not support such a position. But it is scarcely enough that he could not support it; he ought perhaps to condemn it. It is scarcely enough to attack this gross and absurd Communism disseminated in low newspapers. It would perhaps have been better to have unveiled and rebuked that other and more audacious and subtle Communism, which, by the simple perversion of the just idea of the rights of government, insinuates itself into some branches of our legislation, and threatens to invade all.

Protection and Communism — Part 19