5. and as for the group of principles that were extracted from the common notion of Justice, we cannot define each singly in a satisfactory manner, still less reconcile them: 349-352
6. and even the Duty of Good Faith, when we consider the numerous qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by Common Sense, seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent First Principle. Still more is this the case with Veracity: 352-355
7. similarly with other virtues: even the prohibition of Suicide, so far as rational, seems to rest ultimately on utilitarian grounds. 355-357
8. Even Purity when we force ourselves to examine it rigorously yields no clear independent principle. 357-359
9. The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance, but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms. 359-361
MOTIVES OR SPRINGS OF ACTION AS SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT
1. It has been held by several moralists that the “Universal Conscience” judges primarily not of Rightness of acts, but of Rank of Motives. 362-365
2. If, however, we include the Moral Sentiments among these motives, this latter view involves all the difficulties and perplexities of the former, yet it is paradoxical to omit these sentiments. 365-367
3. But even if we leave these out, we still find very little agreement as to Rank of Motives: and there is a special difficulty arising from complexity of motive. Nor does Common Sense seem to hold that a “higher” motive--below the highest--is always to be preferred to a “lower.” 367-372
1. The Philosopher, as such, attempts to penetrate beneath the surface of Common Sense to some deeper principles: 373-374
2. but has too often presented to the world, as the result of his investigation, tautological propositions and vicious circles. 374-379
3. Still there are certain abstract moral principles of real importance, intuitively known; though they are not sufficient by themselves to give complete practical guidance. Thus we can exhibit a self-evident element in the commonly recognised principles of Prudence, Justice, and Benevolence. 379-384
4. This is confirmed by a reference to Clarke’s and Kant’s systems: 384-386
5. and also to Utilitarianism: which needs for its basis a self-evident principle of Rational Benevolence; as is shown by a criticism of Mill’s “proof.” 386-389