3. It may be said that Moral Excellence, like Beauty, eludes definition: but if Ethical Science is to be constituted, we must obtain definite Moral Axioms. 228-230
1. The common conception of Wisdom assumes a harmony of the ends of different ethical methods: all of which--and not one rather than another--the wise man is commonly thought to aim at and attain as far as circumstances admit. 231-233
2. The Will is to some extent involved in forming wise decisions: but more clearly in acting on them--whatever we may call the Virtue thus manifested. 233-236
3. Of minor intellectual excellences, some are not strictly Virtues: others are, such as Caution and Decision, being in part voluntary. 236-237
1. The Maxim of Benevolence bids us to some extent _cultivate_ affections, and confer happiness 238-241
2. on sentient, chiefly human, beings; especially in certain circumstances and relations, in which affections--which are hardly virtues--prompt to kind services. Rules for the distribution of Kindness are needed, 241-246
3. as claims may conflict; but clearly binding rules cannot be obtained from Common Sense in a definite form; 246-247
4. nor clear principles from which rules may be deduced; as is seen when we examine the duties to Kinsmen, as commonly conceived: 247-250
5. and the wider duties of Neighbourhood, Citizenship, Universal Benevolence; and the duties of cultivating Reverence and Loyalty: 250-254
6. and those springing from the Conjugal relation: 254-256
8. and those of Gratitude: and those to which we are prompted by Pity. 259-263
1. Justice is especially difficult to define. The Just cannot be identified with the Legal, as laws may be unjust. Again, the Justice of laws does not consist merely in the absence of arbitrary inequality in framing or administering them. 264-268
2. One element of Justice seems to consist in the fulfilment of (1) contracts and definite understandings, and (2) expectations arising naturally out of the established order of Society; but the duty of fulfilling these latter is somewhat indefinite: 268-271
3. and this social order may itself, from another point of view, be condemned as unjust; that is, as tried by the standard of Ideal Justice. What then is this Standard? We seem to find various degrees and forms of it. 271-274