This is an action on a policy of life insurance, brought in the United States circuit court. The policy was taken out by one Maclean, the plaintiff's testator, on his own life. By a statute of Florida, if the plaintiff recovered, reasonable attorneys' fees were to be found by the jury and added to the judgment. Evidence was offered as to the proper fee, and was objected to on the ground that the statute was contrary to the 14th Amendment. The evidence was admitted subject to exception, the plaintiff got a verdict and judgment, and the case was brought here by writ of error.
In view of the decision in Fidelity Mut. Life Asso. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 46 L. ed. 922, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, the assignment of error in the ruling just stated is not pressed. But although it was that on which the case came up and which gives us jurisdiction, other errors are assigned, which are relied upon and which we must consider. Horner v. United States (No. 2) 143 U.S. 570, 577, 36 L. ed. 266, 269, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522.
The policy purports to be made 'in consideration of the statements and agreements made in the application for this policy, which are hereby made a part of this contract.' The application 'warrants' that the statements in it 'are true, full, and complete, . . . and are offered to the company, together with those contained in the declaration to the Home Life Insurance Company's medical examiner, as a consideration for, and as the basis of, the contract with said company.' The application contained the following questions and answers: Q. Do you drink wine, spirits, or malt liquors? A. Yes. Q. If so, which of these, and to what extent? A. Moderately. Q. Have you ever used them freely or to excess? A. No.' The declaration to the medical examiner contained the following questions and answers: Q. Do you drink wine, spirits, or malt liquors, daily or habitually? A. No habit of drinking liquors. Q. If so, which of these, and to what extent daily? Note. State the daily amount. General terms, such as temperately, 'moderately,' 'occasionally,' will not be accepted, and will necessitate correspondence.' The second of these questions was not answered. The defendant, with superfluous multiplicity of pleas, set up that these answers were warranties, and again, that they were material representations, and that they were false.
Demurrers to the pleas of breach of warranty and some pleas of false representation were sustained, mainly, we presume, on the authority of Moulor v. American L. Ins. Co. 111 U.S. 335, 28 L. ed. 447, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466. So far as the declarations to the medical examiner are concerned, it will be seen that the word 'warrant' does not extend to them. Grammatically, the meaning of the sentence, as it stands, is that the applicant warrants the statements in the application, and warrants that they are offered to the company, together with those in the declaration to the medical examiner, as the basis of the contract. If the sentence is taken a little more intelligently, we should assume that the word 'they' has dropped out between 'and' and 'are offered,' and that 'warrant' does not govern that part of the clause. However read, the meaning is the same. With regard to the answer in the application, denying that the applicant ever had used spirits, etc., to excess, the strong language of the policy, making the application 'part of the contract,' affords ground for argument, at least, that the authority cited does not apply, and that this answer was warranted by the assured. But it is not necessary to decide that question in view of the trial and the subsequent ruling of the court.