When the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, the once firmly regulated Somali charcoal trade reopened. In the 1990s, the Somali Civil War, destructive El Niño floods, and reduced access to the European market caused the former prosperous banana industry to collapse, leading to an increase in reliance on the charcoal trade.

Charcoal soon became a lucrative cornerstone of the political economy in Somalia and ultimately turned into one of the most important revenues for criminal networks such as Al-Shabaab. Despite international efforts to curb the trade during the 2010s, it periodically flourished and continues to be a politically destabilising factor in the Horn of Africa region.

Charcoal trafficking in Somalia

For centuries, the trading route has been established through trade with Arabs along the East African coast. It begins with cutting down and burning Acacia trees in Somalia, then transporting the charred remains by land to ports in southern Somalia (notably the ports of Kismayo and Barawe) before it is moved north by sea for over 4000 kilometers to hubs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Despite a UN Security Council ban on all export of Somali charcoal in 2012, the charcoal trade is often disguised as originating from other countries, and corruption of maritime transport and customs officials is common. Once in the Gulf states, middlemen sell the charcoal in smaller quantities to retailers and restaurants for use in shisha water pipes and grilling meat, respectively.

Charcoal trafficking in Somalia

Impacts of Somali charcoal trafficking

Charcoal trading in the Horn of Africa has resulted in substantial revenues for criminal organisations. During the early 2010s, Al-Shabaab generated US$8–18 million annually by taxing charcoal traffic at a single roadblock. By 2013, the total worth of exports peaked at US$360–384 million per year. Eventually, the trade declined, and by 2018 the wholesale value stood at US$120 to US$150 million per year, with annual revenues to terrorist organisations amounting to US$7.5 to US$10 million. After low to no trade activity in 2019–2021, illicit Somali charcoal trading resurfaced in 2022.

Charcoal trafficking in Somalia

Charcoal trade has a detrimental impact on the environment in Somalia. Notably, charcoal production generates substantial deforestation in the regions of Jubaland, Bay, and Lower Shabelle. The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that during the years 2011 to 2017 approximately 8 million acacia trees were felled to produce 16 million bags of charcoal. This means that on average, one tree was cut down every 30 seconds during this seven-year period. If such a rate of deforestation continues, it would result in the complete depletion of trees in Somalia by the year 2060. Deforestation in turn leaves the country vulnerable to droughts, famines, and floodings and increases the risks for conflicts over resources and severe humanitarian crises.

Drivers of Somali charcoal trafficking

Drivers behind the charcoal trafficking are multifaceted. Somali charcoal traders have expressed that the trade is the only sensible livelihood, as employment is difficult to find and lack of rivers and reliable sources of water renders farming tough. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) representatives have stressed the need to address poverty and invest in opportunity for business to create conditions for other, sustainable forms of livelihood. Weak state institutions and maritime capabilities to monitor, deter and intercept the trade also drives charcoal trafficking.

A key driver of the illicit charcoal trade is the substantial demand for Somali charcoal in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, to whom the bags of charcoal are often marked as legitimate. The business has been lucrative. In 2012, a bag of charcoal that was priced at around 3–4 US$ in Somalia was sold for approximately 10 US$ in the Gulf States. The charcoal trading pattern has exacerbated Somalia's regressive imbalances. It has resulted in Somalia's political elite becoming more reliant on personal patronage and embroiled in competing rivalries, which destabilises both Somalia and the wider Red Sea region.