This case comes here on a certiorari granted to bring up a decision of the circuit court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court and reversing that of a board of United States general appraisers. The respondents imported 'cotton cloth in which other than the ordinary warp and filling threads have been introduced in the process of weaving to form a figure,' to quote the words of paragraph 313 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897 (chap. 11, 30 Stat. at L. 175, 178, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1656, 1659). The collector and board of general appraisers decided that this cloth was liable to a duty of 2 cents per square yard, under that paragraph and also, the different items being valued at over 11, 12, and 12 1/2 cents per square yard, to the ad valorem tax imposed by paragraphs 306 and 307 upon similar plain cloth above those values. The circuit court of appeals, while admitting its belief that Congress intended to place an extra duty on figured cloth, felt bound to decide, upon the language of paragraph 313, that the tax placed by it upon figured cloth was to be added only to specific taxes imposed on less valuable cloths by paragraphs 306 and 307.

To explain: By paragraph 306 cotton cloth not bleached, etc., exceeding 100 and not exceeding 150 threads to the square inch, etc., and not exceeding 4 square yards to the pound, pays 1 1/2 cents per square yard, with an increasing rate as the number of yards to the pound increases. But a proviso substitutes for the foregoing a different set of duties on all cotton cloth with the same count of threads, not bleached, etc., if valued above a certain sum; for instance, if over 9 cents per square yard, 30 per centum ad valorem; if over 11, 35, etc. Paragraph 307 is similar in form for cloths with between 150 and 200 threads.

United States v. George Riggs & Company/Opinion of the Court

By paragraph 313 figured cloth 'shall pay, in addition to the duty herein provided for other cotton cloth of the same description, or condition, weight, and count of threads to the square inch, one cent per square yard if valued at not more than seven cents per square yard, and two cents per square yard if valued at more than seven cents per square yard.' In the judgment appealed from it is assumed that the cloth in question, as figured cloth, is liable to this duty, and that, in deciding what such cloth shall pay, the collector must start from this paragraph. This paragraph must decide to what other duty the one here levied shall be added. If it stopped with the words 'other cotton cloth of the same description, or condition,' no doubt the tax might be added to an ad valorem tax when that would be required by paragraph 306 or 307. Those words might be taken to indicate cloth of similar value in cases within the provisos as well as goods of similar weight taxed under the first part of paragraphs 306 and 307. But, as general words, they would include weight as readily as value; and the mention of weight and count shows that they are used in a narrower sense; for instance, to indicate quality, as bleached or otherwise. Hence the criteria for the duty to which that under 313 is to be added all point to a specific duty alone; and these criteria therefore must determine for figured cloths the duty to which they are liable under paragraphs 306 and 307. You must not alter words in the interest of the imagined intent, and the importers are entitled to the benefit of even a doubt.

United States v. George Riggs & Company/Opinion of the Court

In spite of this reasoning, no one, we take it, has any serious doubt that paragraph 313 was not intended to affect or cut down duties already imposed in clear though general terms. The provisos of the earlier paragraphs are made applicable to 'all cotton cloths' of the sorts described, in so many words. The qualified reading is due to scruples that hardly would occur except to the professional mind. As against those scruples, it is to be observed, in the first place, that the clauses to which we have referred and their neighbors, to go no further into the general scheme of the tariff act, consistently raise the amount of the tax on cotton cloth as the cloth becomes more expensive, and that it would reverse the tendency and go counter to the intent expressed everywhere else, if, in this instance, the more valuable goods were withdrawn from the general tax imposed upon their class. It is said that, in some cases, the construction contended for even would make the duty on figured cotton of a high price less than that on cheap cloth.

United States v. George Riggs & Company/Opinion of the Court