Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

I agree with the Court that through routes were not in existence and that joint rates are therefore not empowered under § 15(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, unqualified by § 15(4). 54 Stat. 898, 911-912, 49 U.S.C. § 15(3), (4), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(3, 4). The controversy thus turns on the enforcement of congressional policy expressed as follows in § 15(4):

Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company/Dissent Frankfurter

'In establishing any such through route the Commission shall not (except as provided in section 3, and except where one of the carriers is a water line) require any carrier by railroad, without its consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route, (a) unless such inclusion of lines would make the through route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through route which could otherwise be established, or (b) unless the Commission finds that the through route proposed to be established is needed in order to provide adequate, and more efficient or more economic, transportation: Provided, however, That in prescribing through routes the Commission shall, so far as is consistent with the public interest, and subject to the foregoing limitations in clauses (a) and (b), give reasonable preference to the carrier by railroad which originates the traffic. * * *'

Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company/Dissent Frankfurter

As is true so often in applying regulatory legislation, the general approach-that is, the starting point-may be determinative of the result. It makes a vital difference whether § 15(4) is deemed a restriction on the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission which is to be closely confined and sharply construed or whether it is deemed to express a legislative command which ought to be heeded and not slightingly enforced. The fact of the matter is that we are dealing with a provision of the law which the Commission has long considered undesirable from the point of view of a national railroad policy and whose repeal it has consistently urged upon Congress. See the history set forth in Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549, 554-556, 72 S.Ct. 978, 981, 982, 96 L.Ed. 1134. Although Congress has, from the time of the Commission's creation and especially in recent years, relied on the Commission as its expert adviser on policy, and legislation has largely reflected the Commission's recommendations, the latter's persistence in recommending repeal of § 15(4) has been matched and overborne by the persistence of Congress in retaining it. Congress has emphatically made clear that in its view the national interest requires the protection of railroads against being short-hauled. Encouragement should not be given to disregard of that policy, even if such disregard occurs through inadequate observance attributable to an unconscious desire to restrict the scope of the statute. In short, when an order of the Commission is brought under judicial scrutiny, and challenge is made that the safeguards of § 15(4) have not been observed, it is the duty of this Court to apply the policy expressed by that section. If the requisite findings or conclusions are ambiguous or unclear, or the policy of the section is slighted, our duty demands remand to the Commission to dispel ambiguity or to secure clarity and obedience to the policy.

Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company/Dissent Frankfurter

It is my view that, even though evidence may be found in the record to support a portion of the order, the Commission did not support the portion on that basis but, on the contrary, appears to have justified the whole order on considerations that collide with congressional policy. The proceedings should therefore be returned to the Commission and the order ought not to be sustained in whole or in part. I will summarize the reasons for this conclusion.