Frequent instances of a like nature occur in the history of the emperors; in that of Alexander’s successors, and of many other countries. Nor can anything be more unhappy than a despotic government of that kind, where the succession is disjointed and irregular, and must be determined on every occasion by force or election. In a free government the matter is often unavoidable, and is also much less dangerous. The interests of liberty may there frequently lead the people in their own defence to alter the succession of the crown, and the constitution being compounded of parts, may still maintain a sufficient stability by resting on the aristocratical or democratical members, though the monarchical be altered from time to time in order to accommodate it to the former.

In an absolute government when there is no legal prince who has a title to the throne, it may safely be determined to belong to the first occupier. Instances of this kind are but too frequent, especially in the Eastern monarchies. When any race of princes expires the will or destination of the last sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of Louis XIV., who called the bastard princes to the succession in case of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in such an event, have some authority.​[104] Thus the will of Charles II. disposed of the whole Spanish monarchy. The cession of the ancient proprietor, especially when joined to conquest, is likewise esteemed a very good title. The general bond of obligation which unites us to government is the interest and necessities of society, and this obligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Present possession has considerable authority in these cases, and greater than in private property, because of the disorders which attend all revolutions and changes of government.​[105]

Hume's Political Discourses — Part 163

We shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no standard by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this kind is erroneous than to find that it leads to paradoxes which are repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind and to general practice and opinion. The doctrine which founds all lawful government on an original contract, or consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ablest of its partisans in prosecution of it scrupled to affirm that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all,​[106] and that the supreme power in a state cannot take from any man by taxes and impositions any part of his property without his own consent or that of his representatives.​[107] What authority any moral reasoning can have which leads to opinions so wide of the general practice of mankind in every place but this single kingdom it is easy to determine.​[108]

Hume's Political Discourses — Part 163