(_e_) Since the existence of the official guardian makes the appointment of private guardians superfluous, the persons who would have otherwise been engaged as private guardians are set free for other spheres of activity.
(_f_) Institutional guardianship renders it possible for the influence of the guardians to be maintained very effectively even after the minor has left the institution.
_Objections to Collective and Institutional Guardianship._--The following objections to collective and to institutional guardianship have been put forward. (_a_) A conflict of interests and duties may arise. The business of the poor-law authorities is to keep down expenses, but the guardian has to think first of all of the interests of his ward, who may need the financial assistance of the poor-law authorities. (_b_) The local authorities are not in a position to carry out properly the duties of official guardianship. In a large local governmental area the circumstances of individual residents are not adequately known; whilst in a small area, suitable official guardians are not likely to be forthcoming. (_c_) The authority administering the work of official guardianship has to accept a position of subordination in relation to the (central) Board of Guardianship. Thus there arises friction, and the autonomy of the local authorities may even be endangered. (_d_) Owing to the fact that the wards under the charge of an official guardian are very numerous, the duties are necessarily discharged in a bureaucratic and stereotyped manner, and the requisite individualisation is lacking.
_These Objections Answered._--There is no doubt whatever that official guardianship gives better results than an otherwise equally efficient system of private guardianship. But the very statement of the antithesis involves a fallacy, for the kernel of the matter is, that in cases in which no competent and willing individual guardian is available, the official guardian is there to take over the necessary duties. The fact that an official guardian exists need not prevent the placing of the child under the guardianship of a suitable private person, should such a one be forthcoming. Objection (_b_) is valid to this extent, that in small local governmental areas, in which the cost of official guardianship falls upon the poor rate, and the burden of this rate is grievously felt, official guardianship cannot be properly carried out. Objection (_d_) has but little validity. Of course, the official guardian cannot do everything himself. He must have confidential assistants, who will visit the foster-parents of the ward, and report to him everything of importance concerning the child. The official guardian has not only to supervise the work of these confidential assistants, to support them with his advice in difficult cases, and to control the necessary expenditure; he has also to attend to all the legal aspects of his charge, and to perform the duties entailed upon him as legal representative of his ward. Thus the official guardian’s duties may be classified as follows: (_a_) the upbringing of his ward; (_b_) legal duties; (_c_) the choice of confidential assistants. In the first department, the most important matter is the careful choice of the foster-parents. The official guardian’s experience and business connections undoubtedly make him far more likely than the individual guardian to secure good foster-parents. The legal duties of the official guardian, such as the provision of maintenance for the child, are merely routine official duties. It is much easier to secure the requisite ten confidential assistants than to secure a hundred private guardians.