The plaintiff sued the Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina, for damages to his farm, resulting from the college having built a dyke which forced the waters of the Seneca river across his land, whereby the soil had been washed away and the land ruined for agricultural purposes. There was no demurrer, but the defendant filed what was treated as a plea to the jurisdiction, in which it averred that it owned no property, and had constructed the dyke as a public agent only, by authority of the state, on land belonging to the state. By stipulation the hearing was confined solely to the question of jurisdiction, and after considering the evidence, the complaint was dismissed.

That ruling and the assignments of error thereon raise the question as to whether a public corporation can avail itself of the state's immunity from suit, in a proceeding against it for so managing the land of the state as to damage or take private property without due process of law.

Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina/Opinion of the Court

With the exception named in the Constitution, every state has absolute immunity from suit. Without its consent it cannot be sued in any court, by any person, for any cause of action whatever. And, looking through form to substance, the 11th Amendment has been held to apply, not only where the state is actually named as a party defendant on the record, but where the proceeding, though nominally against an officer, is really against the state, or is one to which it is an indispensable party. No suit, therefore, can be maintained against a public officer, which seeks to compel him to exercise the state's power of taxation, or to pay out its money in his possession on the state's obligations, or to execute a contract, or to do any affirmative act which affects the state's political or property rights. Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co. 109 U.S. 446, 27 L. ed 992, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609; North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 33 L. ed. 849, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509; Louisiana ex rel. New York Guaranty & I. Co. v. Steele, 134 U.S. 230, 33 L. ed. 891, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 27 L. ed. 448, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 699; Re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Hans v. Louisiana 134, U.S. 1, 33 L. ed. 842, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 43 L. ed. 399, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 70, 29 L. ed. 805, 811, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 608.

Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina/Opinion of the Court

But immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty,-a prerogative of the state itself,-which cannot be availed of by public agents when sued for their own torts. The 11th Amendment was not intended to afford them freedom from liability in any case where, under color of their office, they have injured one of the state's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be to create a privileged class, free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries thereatened. Public agents must be liable to the law, unless they are to be put above the law. For how 'can these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual offenders . . . whenever they interpose the shield of the state? . . . The whole frame and scheme of the political institutions of this country, state and Federal protest' against extending to any agent the sovereign's exemption from legal process. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 291, 29 L. ed. 185, 193, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962.

Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina/Opinion of the Court

The many claims of immunity from suit have therefore been uniformly denied, where the action was brought for injuries done or threatened by public officers. If they were indeed agents, acting for the state, they-though not exempt from suit-could successfully defend by exhibiting the valid power of attorney or lawful authority under which they acted. Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co. 109 U.S. 446, 452, 27 L. ed. 992, 994, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609. But if it appeared that they proceeded under an unconstitutional statute, their justification failed, and their claim of immunity disappeared on the production of the void statute. Besides, neither a state nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tory so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases the law of agency has no application, the wrongdoer is treated as a principal, and individually liable for the damages inflicted, and subject to injunction against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury.