25. Let us now hear the reasons which he gives for this which he pretends to be law. His first reason is, that there would be no security for property, if it were laid open to the necessities of the indigent, of which necessities _no man but the takers themselves could be the judge_. He talks of a "strange insecurity;" but, upon my word, no insecurity could be half so strange as this assertion of his own. BLACKSTONE has just the same argument. "Nobody," says he, "would be a judge of the wants of the taker, but the taker himself;" and BLACKSTONE, copying the very words of HALE, talks of the "strange insecurity" arising from this cause. Now, then, suppose a man to come into my house, and to take away a bit of bacon. Suppose me to pursue him and seize him. He would tell me that he was starving for want of food. I hope that the bare statement would induce me, or any man in the world that I do call or ever have called my friend, to let him go without further inquiry; but, if I chose to push the matter further, there would be _the magistrate_. If he chose to commit the man, would there not be a _jury_ and a _judge_ to receive evidence and to ascertain _whether the extreme necessity existed or not_?
26. Aye, says Judge HALE; but I have another reason, a devilish deal better than this, "and that is, the act of the 43d year of the reign of QUEEN ELIZABETH!" Aye, my old boy, that is a thumping reason! "_Sufficient provision_ is made for the supply of such necessities by _collections for the poor_, and by the _power of the civil magistrate_." Aye, aye! that is the reason; and, Mr. SIR MATTHEW HALE, there is _no other reason_, say what you will about the matter. There stand the overseer and the civil magistrate to take care that such necessities be provided for; and if they did not stand there for that purpose, the law of nature would be revived in behalf of the suffering creature.
27. HALE, not content however with this act of QUEEN ELIZABETH, and still hankering after this hard doctrine, furbishes up a bit of Scripture, and calls Solomon the _wisest of kings_ on account of these two verses which he has taken. HALE observes, indeed, that the Jews did not put thieves to _death_; but, to restore seven-fold was the _ordinary punishment_, inflicted by their law, for theft; and here, says he, we see, that the extreme necessity _gave no exemption_. This was a piece of such flagrant sophistry on the part of HALE, that he could not find in his heart to send it forth to the world without a qualifying observation; but even this qualifying observation left the sophistry still so shameful, that his editor, Mr. EMLYN, who published the work under authority of the House of Commons, did not think it consistent with his reputation to suffer this passage to go forth unaccompanied with the following remark: "But their (the Jews') ordinary punishment being entirely _pecuniary_, could affect him _only when he was found in a condition to answer it_; and therefore the same reasons which could justify that, can, by no means, be extended to a _corporal_, much less to a _capital_ punishment." Certainly: and this is the fair interpretation of these two verses of the Proverbs. PUFFENDORF, one of the greatest authorities that the world knows anything of, observes, upon the argument built upon this text of Scripture, "It may be objected, that, in Proverbs, chap. vi. verses 30, 31, he is called a _thief_, and pronounced obnoxious to the penalty of theft, who steals to satisfy his hunger; but whoever closely views and considers that text will find that the thief there censured is neither in such _extreme necessity_ as we are now supposing, nor seems to have fallen into his needy condition merely by ill fortune, without his own idleness or default: for the context implies, that he had _a house and goods sufficient_ to make seven-fold restitution; which he might have either sold or pawned; a chapman or creditor being easily to be met with in times of plenty and peace; for we have no grounds to think that the fact there mentioned is supposed to be committed, either in time of war, or upon account of the extraordinary price of provisions."