This is an appeal, under Sec. 238 of the Judicial Code as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 345, 28 U.S.C.A. § 345, from a final decree by a district court of three judges, under the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 28 U.S.C. §§ 45, 47a, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 45, 47a, as extended by Sec. 402(a) of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(a), dismissing on the merits a bill to review an order of the Federal Communications Commission.
At the outset a challenge to the jurisdiction of the District Court confronts us. It involves those problems of administrative law which are implied by the doctrine of 'negative orders.' Inasmuch as this phrase is shorthand for a variety of situations, sharp heed must be given to the precise circumstances-inter alia, the statutory provisions for review, the terms of the contested order, the grounds of objection to it-which in this and other cases have invoked the doctrine.
Section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 152(b), provides that, with certain exceptions not here material, the Communications Commission shall not have jurisdiction over any carrier 'engaged in interstate or foreign communication solely through physical connection with the facilities of another carrier not directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with, such carrier.' The appellant, Rochester Telephone Corporation (hereafter called the Rochester), is a New York corporation maintaining a system of telephone communications in and around the City of Rochester. For present purposes the Rochester is to be deemed as engaged in interstate communications solely because of physical connections with the facilities of the New York Telephone Company (hereafter called the New York).
The present controversy grew out of a ruling by the Federal Communications Commission that the Rochester owed obedience to a series of orders issued by the Commission. These orders required all telephone carriers subject to the Act to file schedules of their charges, copies of contracts with other telephone carriers, information concerning their corporate and service history, their relations with affiliates, their use of franks and passes. Copies of these orders were duly served on the Rochester. No response being had, the Telephone Division of the Communications Commission, on October 9, 1935, ordered the Rochester to show cause why it should not be required to file responses to the general orders theretofore served upon it. The Rochester answered, claiming to be outside the requirements of the Act except as to matters not here questioned.
To ascertain the facts in the contested issue, the Commission appointed a trial examiner. At hearings held by him the Rochester entered a special appearance, denying the Commission's jurisdiction and contending that the burden of proof was on the Commission to show that Rochester did not come within the exclusionary provisions of Section 2(b)(2). After a thorough hearing and the submission of briefs, the examiner filed his report, to which the Rochester duly excepted. Upon the basis of these proceedings and of argument before it, the Commission, through its Telephone Division, sustained the findings of its chief examiner, determined that the Rochester was under the 'control' of the New York and therefore not entitled to the classification of a mere connecting carrier under Section 2(b)(2). Accordingly, the Commission ordered the Rochester classified 'as subject to all common carrier provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, and, therefore, subject to all orders of the Telephone Division.' A petition for rehearing before the full Commission was denied.
The Rochester thereupon filed the present bill, alleging that the order entered by the Commission on November 18, 1936, pursuant to its Report, was contrary to undisputed facts and erroneous as a matter of law, and that the Commission's threat to enforce it put the Rochester to the hazard of irreparable injury, and praying that the District Court 'make and enter its order and decree setting aside and annulling said orders of the Federal Communications Commission hereinbefore mentioned, and each and all of them, and enjoining the enforcement of said orders, except in so far as the provisions of said orders * * * have already been complied with.'
The case was disposed of in the District Court on the pleadings and the record before the Commission.