At the end of the reign of Louis XIV., the efforts of the coalition were directed towards the north-eastern frontiers, and the garrison of La Roche-Pont did not get a view of the enemy. However, during the course of the eighteenth century, this fortress was kept in passable condition.
[Footnote 59: See Fig. 67, the section on E, F.]
[Footnote 60: See Fig. 67, the sections on G H and I K.]
On the 31st of December, 1813, the grand army of Bohemia, one hundred and eighty thousand men strong, and commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, crossed the Rhine at Bâle, entered Switzerland, and penetrated into France. Its right bore down on Belfort, Colmar, and Strasburg, its centre marched for Langres, its left for Dijon. The same day the Prussians were crossing the Rhine at Mayence. The invasion of the eastern frontier had to be met by sixty thousand men, at most, echeloned between Epinal and Langres; and this force consisted only of dispirited soldiers and of recruits scarcely knowing how to use their arms. Prince Schwartzenberg's army--which had some reason to fear being attacked on the side of Savoy by the forces commanded by Prince Eugene, and knew that the _débris_ of the army of Spain had orders to make for Lyons with all speed--wishing to secure its base of operation, left detachments before Bésançon, Dôle, along the Saône and between Dijon and Langres, with injunctions to occupy the most favourable strategic position. La Roche-Pont was to be taken; and the generalissimo of the Bohemian army imagined that it was not in a condition to hold out eight-and-forty hours, for he knew that it had no garrison, and that the citizens were little disposed to defend themselves.
Among the inhabitants of La Roche-Pont were some royalist families, whose emissaries had assured the commander-in-chief of the Bohemian army that the whole population were impatiently awaiting the arrival of the Allies to declare for the Bourbons. Prince Schwartzenberg was too clear-sighted, and knew too well to what illusions the royalists were ready to yield themselves, to place an unlimited faith in these statements; and he was anxious not to encounter serious obstacles during his first stages, that he might put himself as speedily as possible in communication with his allies on their way from the north-east. He therefore informed the royalists of La Roche-Pont that it was undesirable to provoke a political manifestation on his march; that the best means of assuring the success of the Allies was to remain quiet; that his troops, in conformity with the proclamation issued by the coalition on entering French territory, would respect property; that they were not animated by a spirit of vengeance, and that their glory would consist in concluding peace as quickly as possible, so as to restore to Europe the repose it so much needed.