Mr. Justice HARLAN, dissenting.
I do not agree that the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain this action to set aside the Commission's 'order.' It seems to me that the case falls squarely within those carefully developed rules which require that judicial intervention be withheld until administrative action has reached its complete development. I find nothing in the nature of the order which commends it to reviewability at this stage other than the fact that its promulgation was preceded by a lengthy investigation and that it contains a series of 'findings' and 'conclusions.' These factors should not be permitted to obscure the true character of the order.
After a self-initiated investigation, in which various carriers participated, the Commission entered this order discontinuing the proceedings and incorporating the 'findings of fact and conclusions' of the Commission. That the order was not intended to be a 'legislative' regulation seems apparent, since it was not put in the form ordinarily used by the Commission in promulgating regulations. The order simply lists the commodities considered by the Commission and determines whether they are within the § 203(b)(6) exemption; it nowhere commands that carriers hauling commodities considered non-exempt comply either with the order or with the general requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. It is clear, therefore, that no administrative or criminal proceeding can be brought for violation of the order itself. And it is equally clear that the proceeding did not conclude any rights as between any specific carriers and the Commission.
The Interstate Commerce Act does, of course, provide for administrative and criminal sanctions to enforce compliance with its provisions. An uncertificated carrier hauling commodities non-exempt under § 203(b)(6) runs the risk of a criminal prosecution under § 222(a) of the Act. But the order has no operative effect in such a proceeding-it does not extend the carrier's criminal liability, which exists because of a violation of the Act and not the order. And if the enforcement takes the form of a cease and desist proceeding against a particular carrier, again the only question would be whether the Act, rather than the order, was being violated. If such an administrative proceeding is instituted, and a cease and desist order is issued, the carrier subject to that order would be entitled to contest the statutory authority of the Commission in judicial proceedings of precisely the scope brought here.
Nor can this order be likened to a determination of status, held reviewable in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754, 83 L.Ed. 1147. As I understand that case, the touchstone of the decision was that the determination 'necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all carriers amenable to the Commission's authority.' 307 U.S. at page 144, 59 S.Ct. at page 764. The specific determination that a particular carrier must comply with Commission regulations is quite different from this order, which is directed to no one in particular and is binding on no one, not even the Commission. Neither can this order be analogized to a declaratory order directed to the status of a particular carrier, which might be reviewable as carrying with it a direct threat of prosecution-see Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, supra, 307 U.S. at page 132, 59 S.Ct. at page 758, note 11. Indeed, the Commission itself does not consider its determinations the final answer to the meaning of the § 203(b)(6) exemption, even for administrative purposes. This is evident from the proceedings in East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 350 U.S. 49, 76 S.Ct. 574, where in a cease and desist proceeding the Commission heard new evidence on whether the particular commodities there involved were within the exemption, and was evidently ready to reconsider the determinations embodied in the order involved here.