[Footnote 221: The words here are _das subjektive Fürsichseyn_, _i.e._, the self-conclusion of an explicit whole in virtue of a principle of ideal unity (_i.e._, life) asserted, throughout.]

[Footnote 222: _Ein Beharrendes_,> one that persists in an inert form.]

The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4) — Part 159

[Footnote 223: Hegel uses the word _scheinen_ both for the ideal manifestation of the Idea in the object and the appearance of material reality reduced by it to mere "show" (_herabgesetzt zum scheinen_), _i.e._, deprived of its independent reality. This introduces a slight confusion I have endeavoured to avoid by using different terms.]

The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4) — Part 159

[Footnote 224: _Unseres Verstandes._ We supply the notion of intelligent purpose.]

The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4) — Part 159

[Footnote 225: That is, the assumed subordination of all organs to one definite end.]

[Footnote 226: _Sichbewegens._ The emphasis is of course on the self. But even then the statement is rather an excess. For it seems difficult to attribute all the beauty visible in the spontaneous movements of so many living creatures, notably that of birds, to their purely formal character. At least there is something given by such motion analogous to the impression we receive from music and the dance; they are _gesetzmässig_ in short.]

[Footnote 227: _Zufällig_--capricious as opposed to a uniform principle. There is, however, one apparent bond of external similarity, between the majority of such members, namely, their covering of skin; this not merely relates the cheek to the neck, for example, but to some extent destroys the distinction.]

[Footnote 228: Physical parts, that is to say.]

[Footnote 229: That is to say, it is based on a purely limited experience which does not necessarily concern the true nature of the objects perceived.]

[Footnote 230: _Stangen._ The word may express the branches on which the flowers are carried or the stamens they carry at their apex.]

[Footnote 231: _Geistreich_, "intelligent," _i.e._, an ingenious way of regarding such facts.]

[Footnote 233: The use of the word _Sinn_ to which Hegel here alludes is not quite identical with our word _Sense._ In the English use of the term there is more stress on the _materia_ presented to sense-perception and perhaps less reference to intellect when the word is employed in such an expression as "That man has sense." However, Milton has "What surmounts the reach of human sense," and no doubt both are employed very similarly in many writers.]