DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) is an Internet security policy mechanism that allows domain name holders to indicate to certificate authorities whether they are authorized to issue digital certificates for a particular domain name. It does this by means of a "CAA" Domain Name System (DNS) resource record.
It was drafted by computer scientists Phillip Hallam-Baker and Rob Stradling in response to increasing concerns about the security of publicly trusted certificate authorities. It is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed standard.
Background
A series of incorrectly issued certificates from 2001 onwards damaged trust in publicly trusted certificate authorities, and accelerated work on various security mechanisms, including Certificate Transparency to track mis-issuance, HTTP Public Key Pinning and DANE to block mis-issued certificates on the client-side, and CAA to block mis-issuance on the certificate authority side.
The first draft of CAA was written by Phillip Hallam-Baker and Rob Stradling, and submitted as an IETF Internet Draft in October 2010. This was progressively improved by the PKIX Working Group, and approved by the IESG as , a Proposed Standard, in January 2013. CA/Browser Forum discussion began shortly afterward, and in March 2017 they voted in favor of making CAA implementation mandatory for all certificate authorities by September 2017. At least one certificate authority, Comodo, failed to implement CAA before the deadline. A 2017 study by the Technical University of Munich found many instances where certificate authorities failed to correctly implement some part of the standard.
In September 2017, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews submitted an Internet Draft intended to simplify the CAA standard. This was improved by the LAMPS Working Group, and approved as , a Proposed Standard, in November 2019.
, Qualys reports that still, only 6.8% of the 150,000 most popular TLS-supporting websites use CAA records.
Record
Certificate authorities implementing CAA perform a DNS lookup for CAA resource records, and if any are found, ensure that they are listed as an authorized party before issuing a digital certificate. Each CAA resource record consists of the following components: flag A flags byte which implements an extensible signaling system for future use. , only the issuer critical flag has been defined, which instructs certificate authorities that they must understand the corresponding property tag before issuing a certificate. This flag allows the protocol to be extended in the future with mandatory extensions, similar to critical extensions in X.509 certificates. tag One of the following property: issue This property authorizes the holder of the domain specified in associated property value to issue certificates for the domain for which the property is published. issuewild This property acts like issue but only authorizes the issuance of wildcard certificates, and takes precedence over the issue property for wildcard certificate requests. iodef This property specifies a method for certificate authorities to report invalid certificate requests to the domain name holder using the Incident Object Description Exchange Format. , not all certificate authorities support this tag, so there is no guarantee that all certificate issuances will be reported. contactemail Increasingly, contact information is not available in WHOIS due to concerns about potential GDPR violations. This property allows domain holders to publish contact information in DNS. contactphone As above, for phone numbers.
value The value associated with the chosen property tag.
The lack of any CAA records authorizes normal unrestricted issuance, and the presence of a single blank issue tag disallows all issuance.
Third parties monitoring certificate authority behavior might check newly issued certificates against the domain's CAA records. states; CAA records MAY be used by Certificate Evaluators as a possible indicator of a security policy violation. Such use SHOULD take into account the possibility that published CAA records changed between the time a certificate was issued and the time at which the certificate was observed by the Certificate Evaluator.
Extensions
specifies "accounturi" and "validationmethods" parameters which allow users to specify desired methods of domain control validation as defined in ACME protocol. For example, website administrator can bind a domain they control to particular account registered with their desired Certification Authority.