MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins, dissenting.

Insofar as the judgment of the Court rests on the view of three of my Brethren that a State cannot constitutionally an on grounds of obscenity the books involved in this case, I dissent on the basis of the views set out in my opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, ante, p. . It is quite plain that these so-called "novels" have "been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner," and that the State's criteria for judging their obscenity are rational.

Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas/Dissent John M. Harlan II

I also disagree with the position taken in the opinion of my Brother BRENNAN that this Kansas procedure unconstitutionally abridged freedom of expression in that the search warrant (1) authorized seizure of all copies of the books in question and (2) was issued without an adversary hearing on the issue of their obsceneness. In my opinion, that position is inconsistent with the thrust of prior cases, and serves unnecessarily to handicap the States in their efforts to curb the dissemination of obscene material.

Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas/Dissent John M. Harlan II

Page

I

The two cases on which MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion almost entirely relies are Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717.

Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas/Dissent John M. Harlan II

In Kingsley Books, appellants challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute that authorized the State Supreme Court to enjoin the sale and distribution of obscene prints and articles. A complaint prayed for an injunction against the further distribution of certain allegedly obscene paperback books and for the destruction by the sheriff of all copies in the appellants' possession. Appellants were ordered to show cause within four days why an injunction pendente lite should not be issued that would preclude distribution of the books. Although the code of criminal procedure provided that anyone sought to be enjoined was entitled to a trial one day after the joinder of issue, appellants consented to the temporary

Page

injunction and delayed bringing the matter to issue. When a hearing on the question of obscenity was finally had, the books were found to be obscene; their distribution was enjoined, and their destruction ordered. This Court upheld the New York procedure, stating:

P. . The State was not, we held, limited to the criminal process in attempting to protect its citizens against the circulation of pornography; it "is not for this Court thus to limit the State in resorting to various weapons in the armory of the law." P. . The Court pointed out that "Criminal enforcement and the proceeding under § 22-a interfere with a book's solicitation of the public precisely at the same stage," p. , that the threat of criminal penalties may be as effective a deterrent against expression as an injunctive civil remedy, and that an injunction against someone to forbear selling specific books may be a less stringent restraint on his freedom of expression than sending him to jail. Near v. Minnesota, , was distinguished on the ground that the New York statute dealt with obscenity, rather than matters deemed to be derogatory to a public officer, and imposed no direct restraint on materials not yet published.

In Marcus v. Search Warrant, warrants to seize books were issued solely on the judgment of a peace officer regarding the obscenity of certain books, without any independent examination by a judicial official; the warrants authorized seizure of books by officers other than the one who had signed the complaints, and, in effect, gave carte blanche to these officers to seize anything they considered obscene at the named wholesale establishment and newsstands, whether or not the material had been so evaluated by anyone prior to the issuance of the warrants. After recounting the historical distrust for systems sanctioning sweeping seizures of materials believed to be offensive to the state, the Court held that

P. . Relevant to this conclusion were the absence of any "scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to be obscene," p. , and the power of the enforcing officers under the warrants to make ad hoc decisions regarding obscenity, although

P. . Kingsley Books was distinguished on the grounds that, in that case: (1) the court "could exercise an independent check on the judgment of the prosecuting authority at a point before any restraint took place"; (2) the restraints "ran only against the named publication"; (3) no extensive restraints were imposed before an adversary proceeding; and (4) the New York code required decision within two days of the trial on the obscenity question, pp. -737.