This is practically a libel in personam for the salvage of government property, viz., of $6,000 duties collected by the government upon a cargo of sugar saved from loss by fire while on board a lighter, in the harbor of New York.
The claim is prosecuted under what is known as the Tucker act (24 Stat. at L. 505, chap. 359, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, pp. 752, 753), the 1st section of which declares that 'the court of claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine . . . all claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States, or any law of Congress, . . . or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States, either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable.'
By the 2d section concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims was vested in the district courts as to all claims not exceeding $1,000.
It is at least doubtful whether an ordinary claim for salvage can be said to arise upon contract, inasmuch as such services are rendered voluntarily, frequently in the absence of the owner of the property, and usually without a definite agreement for compensation. The Liffey, 6 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 255; Five Steel Barges, L. R. 15 Prob. Div. 142. A claim for salvage may undoubtedly be founded upon an express contract, but where the services are rendered, as in this case, without request of an officer of the government, and particularly where they are incidental to services rendered in the saving of private property, we do not think the claim can be said to arise upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States. But the claim may properly be said to be one for unliquidated damages in a case 'not sounding in tort,' in respect of which the party would be entitled to redress in a court of admiralty, if the United States were suable.
The Tucker act also resolves any doubt which might arise as to the responsibility of government property for salvage service, since it was the very object of the act to give a direct recourse against the government. Indeed, that question was settled by this court in 1869, in the case of The Davis (United States v. Douglas) 10 Wall. 15, 19 L. ed. 875, in which personal property of the United States, in transit from one port to another, was held liable to a lien for salvage services rendered in saving the property, following the rule laid down in England in The Marquis of Huntly, 3 Hagg. Adm. 247, and The Lord Nelson, Edw. Adm. 79. The same rule was adopted by Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumn. 308, Fed. Cas. No. 16,694, although both in England and in this country vessels belonging to the United States, or to a foreign sovereign, and engaged in the public service, are exempt from seizure. The Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch, 116, 3 L. ed. 287; The Charkieh, L. R. 4 Adm. & Eccl. 59; The Constitution, L. R. 4 Prob. Div. 39; The Parlement Belge, 4 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 234, L. R. 5 Prob. Div. 197.
The fact, however, that the property saved is not within the physical possession of the court, but is of an intangible nature, like freight or customs dues, does not prevent the maintenance of a libel in personam against the owner. Indeed, general admiralty rule No. 19 provides that 'in all suits for salvage the suit may be in rem . . . or in personam against the party at whose request, and for whose benefit, the salvage services have been performed.' In the case of freight the practice is to require its payment into court. The Leo Lush. 444.
At the basis of the claim in this case lies the proposition that, although the duties had been actually paid before the services had been rendered, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to refund duties upon so much of the sugar as would have been lost by the fire had not the cargo been rescued by the salvors. The obligation to refund such duties is contained in the following sections of the Revised Statutes: