July 14, to General J. E. Smith, at Allatoona: "If you entertain a bare suspicion against any family, send it North. Any loafer or suspicious person seen at any time should be imprisoned and sent off. If guerrillas trouble the road or wires they should be shot without mercy."
September 8, to General Webster after the capture of Atlanta: "Don't let any citizens come to Atlanta; not one. I won't allow trade or manufactures of any kind, but you will remove all the present population, and make Atlanta a pure military town." To General Halleck he writes: "I am not willing to have Atlanta encumbered by the families of our enemies." Of this wholesale depopulation, General Hood complained, by flag of truce, as cruel and contrary to the usages of civilized nations and customs of war, receiving this courteous and gentlemanly reply (September 12): "I think I understand the laws of civilized nations and the 'customs of war;' but, if at a loss at any time, I know where to seek for information to refresh my memory." General Hood made the correspondence, or part of it, public, on which fact, General Sherman remarks to General Halleck: "Of course, he is welcome, for the more he arouses the indignation of the Southern masses, the bigger will be the pill of bitterness they will have to swallow."
About the middle of September, General Sherman, being still in Atlanta, endeavored to open private communication with Governor Brown and Vice-President Stephens, whom he knew to be at variance with the administration at Richmond on certain points of public policy. Mr. Stephens refused to reply to a verbal message, but wrote to Mr. King, the intermediary, that if the general would say that there was any prospect of their agreeing upon "terms to be submitted to the action of their respective governments," he would, as requested, visit him at Atlanta. The motives urged by Mr. King were General Sherman's extreme desire for peace, and to hit upon "some plan of terminating this fratricidal war without the further effusion of blood." But in General Sherman's despatch of September 14, to Mr. Lincoln, referring to these attempted negotiations, the humanitarian point of view is scarcely so prominent. He says: "It would be a magnificent stroke of policy if I could, without surrendering a foot of ground or principle, arouse the latent enmity to Davis."