France seemed to call aloud, to see her eclipsed greatness restored. She had recovered all her energy: an evident proof, that the strength of a nation is always the work of the prince, by whom it is governed. It is he, who enervates the public spirit, and bastardizes his subjects, by the effeminacy of his government: or it is he, who inspires them with the love of their country, with priding themselves in it, and leads them to undertake, whatever can augment its glory and its power.
To draw still more closely the bonds of union between the French people, and impart greater intensity to their patriotism, Napoleon authorized the re-establishment of popular clubs, and the formation of civic confederations. This time his expectations were not answered by success. The major part of the clubs were filled with men, who formerly composed the revolutionary tribunals and societies; and their imprecations against kings, and their liberticide motions, made the Emperor fear, that he had revived the spirit of anarchy.
The sentiments manifested by the federates equally disquieted him. He perceived, that he did not occupy the first place in their thoughts and affections; that the primary wish of their hearts was liberty; and, as this liberty was in his eyes synonimous with republicanism, he exerted all his endeavours to moderate, restrain, and repress, the development of these patriotic associations. Perhaps there were men among the federates, whose principles might be dangerous, and their intentions criminal: but in general they consisted of pure patriots, who had taken up arms to defend the imperial government, and not to overturn it.
Napoleon had never been able to surmount the aversion, which he felt for the veterans of the revolution. He dreaded their constancy, and their daring spirit; and he would have thought himself in danger, if not lost, had they become consolidated, and resumed their ascendancy. This panic fear was the cause, that he did not reap from the confederations the advantages he promised himself; and which they would unquestionably have afforded him, if he had not clogged their wings. It was also the cause of his committing a perhaps still greater fault, that of putting a stop to the popular movements, that had shown themselves in most of the departments. In the critical state in which he found himself, and into which he had drawn France, he should not have disregarded any means of security; and the most efficacious, the most analogous to his situation, was indisputably that of engaging the people most intimately in his fate, and in his defence. It was necessary, therefore, while preventing them from spilling a single drop of blood, to let them compromise themselves with some of those incorrigible ultras, who had harassed, ill-treated, and insulted them, since the restoration. The people would then have been more sensible, that it was no longer the personal cause of Napoleon alone, that they had to defend; and the dread of chastisement, and of the yoke, would have restored to them that ancient enthusiasm, which had proved so fatal to the first coalition.