The first question is, of course, one of jurisdiction. Final orders of the circuit court of appeals may of right be brought to this court only where the matter in dispute exceeds in value $1,000. As there is no amount in controversy, the appeal was unauthorized and must be dismissed. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 58, 36 L. ed. 340, 344, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517. But by certiorari the judgment of the court of appeals is properly before us. Re Chetwood, 165 U.S. 443, 462, 41 L. ed. 782, 788, 17 Sup.Ct.Rep. 385.
Had the court of appeals jurisdiction to issue separately either a writ of certiorari or one of habeas corpus, or the two jointly? And, first, as to the writ of habeas corpus. Undoubtedly that writ is one of high privilege. We are not confronted with the case of a failure by Congress to make any provision vision for it. Under § 751, Rev. Stat. (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 592), the Supreme, circuit, and district courts may issue writs of habeas corpus, and by § 752 (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 592), like power is given to the several justices and judges of said courts for the purpose of inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty. Thus adequate provision has been made for securing to everyone entitled thereto the writ of habeas corpus. So, when Congress passes an act establishing a new court, there is no constraining presumption that it must intend to give to that court jurisdiction in habeas corpus. The court of appeals act (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 488) does not in terms grant authority to issue the writ. It is silent on the subject, and in order to sustain its jurisdiction we must write something into the statute which Congress itself did not put there. In this we are speaking of the writ of habeas corpus as an original and independent proceeding, for by § 12 of the act 'the circuit court of appeals shall have the powers specified in § 716 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 580).' Section 716 provides that 'the Supreme Court and the circuit and district courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias. They shall also have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.' Cases may arise in which the writ of habeas corpus is necessary to the complete exercise of the appellate jurisdiction vested in the circuit court of appeals. But it is unnecessary to speculate under what circumstances such an exigency may exist, for the writ, asked for here was an independent and original proceeding challenging in toto the validity of a judgment rendered in another court. There was no proceeding of an appellate character pending in the court of appeals, for the complete exercise of jurisdiction in which any auxiliary writ of habeas corpus was requisite. Appellate proceedings are, generally speaking, initiated by appeals and writs of error, and for these the court of appeals act specifically provides. The writ of habeas corpus is not the equivalent of an appeal or writ of error. It is not a proceeding to correct errors which may have occurred in a trial of the case below. It is an attack directly upon the validity of the judgment, and, as has been frequently said, it cannot be transformed into a writ of error. It is doubtless true that if the language of the court of appeals act was fairly susceptible of two constructions, one granting and the other omitting to grant power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, the great importance of the writ might justify a construction upholding the grant. This is indicated by the ruling in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 2 L. ed. 554. The 14th section of the original judiciary act contained this language: 'That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.' [1 Stat. at L. 81, chap. 20, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 580.] And the question presented was whether the grant of power to issue a writ of habeas corpus was an absolute and independent grant or one simply authorizing the issue of the writ when necessary for and in aid of the exercise of a jurisdiction already otherwise obtained, and it was held to be an absolute and independent grant, the conclusion being placed by Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court, partly on the grammatical construction of the section and partly on the significance and importance of the writ itself.