On March 3, 1930, the appellant, an insurance company, issued to Jonas McCray a policy of life insurance for $500 payable to his wife, the appellee in this court. The policy lapsed in June, 1931, for nonpayment of a premium within the period of grace, but in August, 1931, it was reinstated with the company's consent. On May 10, 1932, the insured committed suicide. If suicide occurred within a year from the date of issue of the policy, the insurer's liability was limited to a return of any premiums paid by the insured. If suicide occurred after the expiration of the year, the liability was the same as upon a death from other causes. The appellee made proof of claim against the insurer, insisting that the year was to be calculated from the original date of issue. The company refused payment upon the ground that the year was to be calculated from the time of reinstatement. Judgment went against the insurer in the trial court, and again, upon appeal, in the Supreme Court of the state. (Ark.) 58 S.W.(2d) 199. The controversy here grows out of the amount of the recovery. To the face of the policy with interest at 6 per cent. there were added certain statutory allowances, which are contested in this court. One of the additions was an attorney's fee of $200 ($100 for the trial and $100 for the appeal). The other was an award of 12 per cent. computed on the payments due under the contract. These increments are authorized by a statute of Arkansas which is quoted in the margin. The insurer contests the validity of the statute, insisting that it is condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment. The case is here upon appeal.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the award of an attorney's fee, moderate in amount, when payment of a policy of life insurance has been wrongfully refused.
We assume in accordance with the assumption of the court below that payment was resisted in good faith and upon reasonable grounds. Even so, the unsuccessful defendant must pay the adversary's costs, and costs in the discretion of the lawmakers may include the fees of an attorney. There are systems of procedure neither arbitrary nor unenlightened, and of a stock akin to ours, in which submission to such a burden is the normal lot of the defeated litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant. The taking master in the English courts may allow the charges of the barrister as well as the fees of the solicitor. Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a like procedure here. The assurance of due process has not stereotyped bills of costs at the rates known to the Fathers. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43 S.Ct. 55, 67 L.Ed. 115; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904, 68 A.L.R. 434. Nor is there an unjust discrimination, an arbitrary denial of the equal protection of the laws, in laying the burden on insurers and not on all defendants. Diversity of treatment in respect of the costs of litigation has its origin and warrant in diversity of social needs. Dohany v. Rogers, supra. Dependents left without a breadwinner will be exposed to sore distress if life insurance payments are extracted slowly and painfully, after costly contests in the courts. Health and accident insurance will often be the sources from which the sick and the disabled are to meet their weekly bills. Fire insurance moneys, if withheld, may leave the business man or the householder without an office or a home. Classification prompted by these needs is not tyrannical or arbitrary. As to that, the judgments of this court in situations precisely apposite have set a closure to debate. Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 22 S.Ct. 662, 46 L.Ed. 922; Iowa Life Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 187 U.S. 335, 23 S.Ct. 126, 47 L.Ed. 204; Farmers' & Merchants' Insurance Co. v. Dobney, 189 U.S. 301, 23 S.Ct. 565, 47 L.Ed. 821.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a fixed award of damages, moderate in amount, in addition to the costs and the fees of the attorney, when the payment of a policy of life insurance has been wrongfully refused.