Mr. Justice REED, with whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice BURTON join, dissenting.
The ultimate question presented by this case is whether the defective dome platform which caused petitioner's injury is a safety appliance within the meaning of § 2 of the Act of April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. § 11, 45 U.S.C.A. § 11. The Court holds that the dome platform is a 'running board' within the meaning of § 2, and that the tank car involved here was a car 'requiring' the platform.
First, it can hardly be said that the dome platform is a running board as that term is used in § 2 of the Act. It appears that every device regulated by the Safety Appliance Act is principally designed for use by, and for the protection of, trainmen while railroad cars are in motion. Certainly there is no indication that this legislation was meant to regulate all devices and appliances employed on railroad cars; and there is nothing in the legislative history upon which to base a belief that equipment designed principally for loading and unloading cars, such as a dome platform, was to be covered by the statute. Moreover, while a dome platform might be loosely spoken of as a running board, it does not appear that it falls within the technical definition of that term as used in the trade. A running board is a 'plane surface, made of boards or special metal structure, for trainmen to walk or run on.' The platform involved here is used principally to stand on to give convenient access to the top of the dome.
However, the principal ground upon which I dissent is aside from the question whether a dome platform is a 'running board' under § 2. Assuming that it is, it does not follow that the respondent violated the Act. Pursuant to such an assumption, I will read § 2 of the statute as though the words 'dome platforms' appear in the place of 'running boards.' But even then not every defective dome platform is prohibited by the statute. So far as pertinent here, § 2 provides that 'all cars requiring * * * secure running boards (viz., dome platforms) shall be equipped with such * * *.' The congressional mandate then is merely that railroad carriers shall provide secure dome platforms on cars 'requiring' them. No other dome platforms would be safety appliances under this Act. Therefore, the inquiry here narrows to whether this tank car 'required' a dome platform.
Section 2 does not itself indicate any means for determining which cars require running boards (dome platforms), and thus does not specify which dome platforms, if any, are safety appliances. However, § 3 of the Act provides that within six months 'the Interstate Commerce Commission, after hearing, shall designate the number, dimensions, location, and manner of application of the appliances provided for by section two of this Act * * *' and that those designations are to remain as railroad equipment standards unless changed by the Commission. It seems inescapable, just as a matter of logic, that since § 3 gave to the Commission the duty to determine, among other things, how many of the 'required' § 2 appliances shall be used and where they shall be placed, the Commission was thereby meant to determine which are cars 'requiring' running boards (dome platforms), and therefore which dome platforms, if any, are safety appliances. Moreover, if it be assumed that the statute is ambiguous on this matter, the other alternative is to leave to the courts the determination of which types of cars require dome platforms, or any other § 2 equipment except sill steps and hand-brakes, to be revealed ad hoc. The creation of such uncertainties is not to be favored. But in view of the existence of the Interstate Commerce Commission, an administrative expert in the safety requirements of the railroad industry, coupled with the explicit delegation to the Commission by § 3 of the authority to designate the number and location of the appliances required by § 2, it would seem difficult to conclude anything but that Congress made railroads responsible as insurers only for such running boards as the Commission, not the courts, might determine are required. This purpose of Congress is even more clear from the words of the Act itself than it is from the Code sections, codified long after the regulations were issued.
