§ 2. (_b_) Since the prime object of a Trust is to effect sales at profitable prices, and prices are directly determined by the quantitative relation between supply and demand, it is clearly advantageous for a Trust to obtain as full a power in the regulation of the quantity of supply as is possible. In order to effect this object the Trust will pursue a double policy. It will buy up such rival businesses as it deems can be worked advantageously for the purposes of the Trust. The price at which it will compel the owners of such businesses to sell will have no precise relation to the value of the business, but will depend upon the amount of trouble which such a business can cause by refusing to come into the Trust. If the outstanding firm is in a strong position the Trust can only compel it to sell, by a prolonged process of cutting prices, which involves considerable loss. For such a business a high price will be paid. By this means a strongly-established Trust or Syndicate will bring under its control the whole of the larger and better-equipped businesses which would otherwise by their competition weaken the Trust's control of the market. A smaller business, or an important rival who persistently stands out of the Trust, is assailed by the various weapons in the hands of the Trust, and is crushed by the brute force of its stronger rival. The most common method of crushing a smaller business is by driving down prices below the margin of profit, and by the use of the superior staying power which belongs to a larger capital starving out a competitor. This mode of exterminating warfare is used not merely against actually existing rivals, as where a railway company is known to bring down rates for traffic below cost price in order to take the traffic of a rival line, but is equally effective against the potential competition of outside capital. After two or three attempts to compete with Jay Gould's telegraph line from New York to Philadelphia had been frustrated by a lowering of rates to a merely nominal price, the notoriety of this terrible weapon sufficed to check further attempts at competition. In this way each strongly-formed Trust is able to fence off securely a certain field of investment, thus narrowing the scope of use for any outside capital. This employment of brute force is sometimes spoken of as "unfair" competition, and treated as something distinct from ordinary trade competition. But the difference drawn is a purely fallacious one. In thus breaking down a competitor the Trust simply makes use of those economies which we have found to attach to large-scale businesses as compared with small. Its action, however oppressive it may seem from the point of view of a weaker rival, is merely an application of those same forces which are always operating in the evolution of modern capital. In a competitive industrial society there is nothing to distinguish this conduct of a Trust in the use of its size and staying power from the conduct of any ordinary manufacturer or shopkeeper who tries to do a bigger and more paying business than his rivals. Each uses to the full, and without scruple, all the economic advantages of size, skill in production, knowledge of markets, attractive price-lists, and methods of advertisement which he possesses. It is quite true that so long as there is competition among a number of fairly equal businesses the consuming public may gain to some extent by this competition, whereas the normal result of the successful establishment of a Trust is simply to enable its owners to take higher profits by raising prices to the consumer. But this does not constitute a difference in the mode of competition, so that in this case it deserves to be called "fair," in the other "unfair."