I shall conclude this subject with observing that we have with regard to taxes an instance of what frequently happens in political institutions, that the consequence of things are diametrically opposite to what we should expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the Turkish Government that the Grand Seignior, though absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax; and every Ottoman prince who has made such an attempt either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the world against oppression, yet it is certain that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increasing his revenue, must allow all the pashas and governors to oppress and abuse the subjects, and these he squeezes after their return from their government; whereas, if he could impose a new tax, like our European princes, his interest would so far be united with that of his people that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly levies of money, and would find that a pound raised by general imposition would have less pernicious effects than a shilling taken in so unequal and arbitrary a manner.

[26] _Account of the Netherlands_, chap. vi.

Hume's Political Discourses — Part 75

It appears to have been the common practice of antiquity to make provision in times of peace for the necessities of war, and to hoard up treasures beforehand as the instruments either of conquest or defence, without trusting to extraordinary imposts, much less to borrowing, in times of disorder and confusion. Besides the immense sums above mentioned​[27] which were amassed by Athens, and by the Ptolemies and other successors of Alexander, we learn from Plato that the frugal Lacedemonians had also collected a great treasure; and Arrian and Plutarch​[28] specify the riches which Alexander got possession of on the conquest of Susa and Ecbatana, and which were reserved, some of them, from the time of Cyrus. If I remember right, the Scripture also mentions the treasure of Hezekiah and the Jewish princes, as profane history does that of Philip and Perseus, kings of Macedon. The ancient republics of Gaul had commonly large sums in reserve. Every one knows the treasure seized in Rome by Julius Cæsar during the civil wars, and we find afterwards that the wiser emperors, Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Severus, etc., always discovered the prudent foresight of saving great sums against any public exigency.

Hume's Political Discourses — Part 75