Julian, Count of Ceuta (,, , ( ) was, according to some sources, a renegade governor, possibly a former comes in Byzantine service in Ceuta and Tangiers who subsequently submitted to the king of Visigothic Spain before secretly allying with the Muslims. According to Arab chroniclers, Julian had an important role in the Umayyad conquest of Hispania, a key event in the history of Islam, and in the subsequent history of what were to become Spain and Portugal.
Historicity
As a historical figure, little is known about Count Julian. The earliest extant source describing Julian is Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam's 9th-century Kitāb futuḥ misr wa akbārahā (The History of the Conquests of Egypt, North Africa, and Spain), which claims that Julian first resisted the Muslim conquest of the Maghreb, and then joined the Umayyad conquest of Hispania. Other details, such as the existence of a daughter known as La Cava, appear in the 11th century. The debate concerning Julian's historicity ranges at least to the 19th century; by the 21st century, the academic consensus seemed to lean toward Julian being ahistorical, with most scholars since the 1980s agreeing with Roger Collins that the portions of the story concerning Florinda la Cava are fantastical and that arguments for even Julian's existence are weak, while not entirely excluding the possibility that he was a real personage.
Byzantine and native resistance and the importance of Ceuta
Byzantine strategy at the time, as articulated by John Troglita, a Byzantine general under Justinian I, advocated dispersal and retreat back to artificially or naturally fortified places and ambush tactics against a superior foe. This left scattered Byzantine garrisons surrounded by territory already conquered by the Arabs. The autochthonous Berber tribes also resisted either in concert with the Byzantines, or under native leaders like Dihya (Kahina) and Kusaila (Caecilius). In the view of Walter Kaegi, this strategy was designed to protect the key towns and communications routes, and did so.
Ceuta, a city on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa that is today an exclave of Spain, was the only place on the coast of the former province that could be sealed off with a small number of troops and held without significant reinforcement. The last securely known commander of Septem is Philagrius, a Byzantine treasurer who was exiled there in 641. Afterwards, the Byzantines may have lost control of the fortress in the chaos of Constans II's reign. Julian, who held what Kaegi characterizes as the "vague" title of count (quite common in this period, as detailed below), may have, in Kaegi's view, had some Byzantine title or rank for which no documentation exists before falling under the control of Theodoric. In Kaegi's view, if Julian had a daughter in Spain, it would have been in a hostage situation, used as a check on his loyalty on the part of the Goths.
The comes in the late Roman army
Julian was reportedly a count, the "Commander of Septem" (present-day Ceuta), and according to some scholars, possibly the last Byzantine Exarch of Africa.
In Byzantine North Africa the curial title comes () was applied to the leader of a regiment (a successor to the old legion), and, according to Maurice's Strategicon, was analogous to the title and dignity of tribune. The Exarchate of Africa was divided into ducates led by a duke (, ), also called strategos (στρατηγός). According to the Notitia Dignitatum, each duke would have had a chief of staff (princeps) and numerous staff officers in addition to the counts in charge of each legion under his command.
The Army of Africa initially had 15,000 troops: the historian Procopius says that Belisarius (a general under the emperor Justinian I) took with him to Africa 15,000 soldiers, as well as 2,000 karabisianoi (marines), 1,000 mercenaries, and various members of Belisarius' own personal retinue to fight in the Vandalic War; they were ferried there by 30,000 oarsmen.. Treadgold views these army troops as intended to garrison Africa after its reconquest, while the naval and mercenary elements were there only temporarily to help effect it. This view is supported by the fact that the same levels of army troop numbers for Africa (15,000) are still reported in the time of Maurice, with 5,000 for Byzantine Spain (although after the mutiny against and deposition of Maurice, Africa's troop strength was probably reduced due to Visigothic and Moorish attacks). The Strategicon reports that the army troops in Africa under Maurice comprised about 5,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry.