[343] See my prize-essay "On the Fundament of Morality," § 6.
[344] "Die Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse" (The Doctrine of Science in a general outline), 18, 10.
Now, from this point of view, a system which places the reality of all existence and the root of the whole of Nature in _the Will_, and in this will places the root of the world, must undeniably carry with it, to say the least, a strong prejudice in its favour. For, by a direct and simple way, it reaches, nay, already holds in its hand before coming to Ethics, what other systems try to reach by roundabout, ever dubious by-paths. Nor indeed can any other road ever lead to this but the insight, that the active and impulsive force in Nature which presents this perceptible world to our intellect, is identical with the will within us. The only Metaphysic which really and immediately supports Ethics, is that one which is itself primarily ethical and constituted out of the material of Ethics. Therefore I had a far greater right to call my Metaphysic "Ethics," than Spinoza, with whom the word sounds almost like irony, and whose "Ethics" might be said to bear the name like _lucus a non lucendo_; since it is only by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his morality on to a system, from which it would never logically proceed. In general, moreover, he disavows it downright with revolting assurance.[345] On the whole, I can confidently assert, that there has never yet been a philosophical system so entirely cut out of one piece, so completely without any joins or patches, as mine. As I have said in my preface, it is the unfolding of a single thought, by which the ancient ἁπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ[346] is again confirmed. Then we must still take into consideration here, that freedom and responsibility--those pillars on which all morality rests--can certainly be asserted in words without the assumption of the aseity[347] of the will; but that it is absolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever wishes to dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom, stated long ago by the Schoolmen: _operari sequitur esse_ (_i.e._ the acts of each being follow from the nature of that being), or we must demonstrate the fallacy of the inference to be drawn from it: _unde esse, inde operari_. Responsibility has for its condition freedom; but freedom has for its condition primariness. For I _will_ according to what I _am_; therefore I must _be_ according to what I _will_. Aseity of the will is therefore the first condition of any Ethics based on serious thought, and Spinoza is right when he says: _Ea res libera dicetur, quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate_ existit, _et a se sola ad agendum determinatur_.[348] Dependence, as to existence and nature, united with freedom as to action, is a contradiction. Were Prometheus to call the creatures of his making to account for their actions, they would be quite justified in answering: "We could only act according to our being: for actions arise from nature. If our actions were bad, the fault lay in our nature: this is thine own work; punish thyself."[349] And it is just the same with the imperishableness of our true being in death; for this cannot be seriously thought without the aseity of that being, and can even hardly be conceived without a fundamental separation of the will from the intellect. This last point is peculiar to my philosophy; but Aristotle had already proved the first thoroughly, by showing at length how that alone can be imperishable which has not arisen, and that the two conceptions condition each other:[350] Ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τό τε ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον.... τὸ γὰρ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις.--εἰ γενητόν τι, φθαρτὸν ἀνάγκη[351] (_hæc mutuo se sequuntur, atque ingenerabile est incorruptibile, et incorruptibile ingenerabile.... generabile enim et corruptibile mutuo se sequuntur.--si generabile est, et corruptibile esse necesse est_). All those among the ancient philosophers who taught an immortality of the soul, understood it in this way; nor did it enter into the head of any of them to assign infinite permanence to a being _having arisen_ in any way. We have evidence of the embarrassment to which the contrary assumption leads, in the ecclesiastical controversy between the advocates of Pre-existence, Creation and Traduction.