The French, as already noticed, had, about three o'clock, obtained possession of the Bois de Bossu and driven out the Belgians. They were in return themselves expelled by the British guards, who successfully resisted every attempt made by the French to penetrate into the wood during the day.
As the English reinforcements arrived in succession, Maréchal Ney became desirous of an addition of numbers, and sent to procure the assistance of D'Erlon's division, posted, as has been said, near Marchiennes. But these troops had been previously ordered to succour Buonaparte's own army. As the affair of Ligny was, however, over before they arrived, the division was again sent back towards Frasnes to assist Ney; but his battle was also by this time over, and thus D'Erlon's troops marched from one flank to the other, without firing a musket in the course of the day. The battle of Quatre-bras terminated with the light. The British retained possession of the field, which they had maintained with so much obstinacy, because the Duke of Wellington conceived that Blucher would be able to make his ground good at Ligny, and was consequently desirous that the armies should retain the line of communication which they had occupied in the morning.
But the Prussians, evacuating all the villages which they held in the neighbourhood of Ligny, had concentrated their forces to retreat upon the river Dyle, in the vicinity of Wavre. By this retrograde movement, they were placed about six leagues to the rear of their former position, and had united themselves to Bulow's division, which had not been engaged in the affair at Ligny. Blucher had effected this retreat, not only without pursuit by the French, but without their knowing for some time in what direction he had gone.
This doubt respecting Blucher's movements, occasioned an uncertainty and delay in those of the French, which were afterwards attended with the very worst consequences. Napoleon, or General Gourgaud in his name, does not hesitate to assert, that the cause of this delay rested with Maréchal Grouchy, on whom was devolved the duty of following up the Prussian retreat. "If Maréchal Grouchy," says the accusation, "had been at Wavre on the 17th, and in communication with _my_ (Napoleon's) right, Blucher would not have dared to send any detachment of his army against me on the 18th; or if he had, I would have destroyed them."[139] But the maréchal appears to make a victorious defence. Grouchy says, that he sought out the Emperor on the night of the 16th, so soon as the Prussian retreat commenced, but that he could not see him till he returned to Fleurus; nor did he obtain any answer to his request of obtaining some infantry to assist his cavalry in following Blucher and his retreating army, excepting an intimation that he would receive orders next day. He states, that he went again to headquarters in the morning of the 17th, aware of the full importance of following the Prussians closely up, but that he could not see Buonaparte till half-past seven, and then was obliged to follow him to the field of battle of the preceding day, previous to receiving his commands. Napoleon talked with various persons on different subjects, without giving Grouchy any orders until near noon, when he suddenly resolved to send the maréchal with an army of 32,000 men, not upon Wavre, for he did not know that the Prussians had taken that direction, but to follow Blucher wherever he might have gone. Lastly, Grouchy affirms that the troops of Gérard and Vandamme, who were placed under his command, were not ready to move until three o'clock. Thus, according to the maréchal's very distinct narrative, the first orders for the pursuit were not given till about noon on the 17th, and the troops were not in a capacity to obey them until three hours after they were received. For this delay Grouchy blames Excelmans and Gérard, who commanded under him. His corps, at any rate, was not in motion until three o'clock upon the 17th.[140]