Orders to move were circulated on the 22d and at four o'clock in the forenoon of the 23rd, drowsy men were summoned from their sleep to pack-up and be ready for another change, starting from their late camp at about sunrise. On reaching Bealton, a union was effected with the remainder of the division and a few miles further, towards the Rappahannock, camp was made for the night, all realizing that cold weather was upon them and that the burdens, on the march by day, had to be heavy in order to insure any comfort for the night. Rain fell very easily during those days, and it was somewhat discouraging to have to turn out at 4 a. m. and, breakfasting at an early hour, to stand in line momentarily expecting the order, "Forward," and all the time pelted by the falling rain. After a while we were ordered to put up our tents again, a change of mind having been experienced higher up. Wednesday, the 25th, differed in no essential from its predecessor, though many of the men were wondering whether the mail, express or freight, would bring them anything from home by way of a reminder of Thanksgiving, due on the 26th. Disappointment was the lot of all, for authorities in Washington must have known of impending activity and so withheld what thoughtful friends had attempted to forward to the army; sutlers however put in an appearance, an ill-starred act, on their part, as the morrow was to show.
Thanksgiving day in the North, November 26th, should be remembered as the beginning of the famous Mine Run affair, one of the greatest of the battles that were never fought. Judging from results in former years, when campaigning was undertaken at this season of the year, it would seem that winter quarters would be a better proposition for the army than another forward movement, but General Meade, feeling that the Northern public demanded some aggressive movement on his part, determined to avail himself of the withdrawal of Longstreets' Corps and the remoteness of Lee's remaining Corps, Ewell's and Hill's, from each other, and to take the offensive. Ewell's men, under the command of General Jubal A. Early, Ewell being ill, held the Confederate right, the same resting on the Rapidan at Morton's Ford, while Hill's forces in their dispersion extended fully twenty miles to the southwest. Meade could lead 70,000 men into the assault, while Lee's troops were rated at 50,000; the lower fords of the Rapidan were quite uncovered, Lee depending for defence on a line of fortifications extending along the left bank of Mine Run, an insignificant stream, tributary to the Rapidan and entering the same near Morton's Ford. The words of Robert Burns concerning the plans of mice and men never had better application than in the events of the following days. Had army corps crossed and attacked as projected, considering the detached, not to say scattered, condition of the enemy, it seems as though he would have been beaten in detail.