The first procedure was to classify the crash. The method adopted will be seen in the index of the graph on page 229. Prior, however, to this classification, which of course is only established by means of close technical examination of the damaged machine, the unit to which the machine belonged sent to headquarters by telegraph or telephone, whichever was the faster, the following information:--
(1) Regimental number, rank and name of personnel concerned, stating which is pilot and which is passenger.
(6) Number of hours solo and dual flown by casualty.
(7) Whether next-of-kin has been notified.
(8) Whether Canadian press (if necessary) has been notified.
(9) Whether court of enquiry is being held.
The next procedure was to further analyze the accident by establishing as quickly as possible all facts which might tend to elucidate information. Under the nine succeeding headings come also certain crashes from one or more contributory causes--the latter to be further classified in relative proportion, whether primary or secondary.
i. Aeroplane defect-- (a) Breakage. (b) Engine failure. (c) Faulty rigging.
ii. Error of judgment-- (a) Not due to poor instruction. (b) Probably due to poor instruction.
viii. Disobeying-- (a) Rules of the air. (b) Instructions for that flight. (c) Standing orders.
ix. Weather (wing visibility, temperature effects).
As some accidents will have one or more contributory causes, they will be shown under two headings:--
Primary cause. Secondary or contributory cause.
It will be seen at a glance that the bringing forth of this information involved reference to records already in existence, and which had been maintained with particular care in order they might be fully available when thus crucially needed. There was sent, furthermore, specified information with regard to certain possible contributory causes, such as “loss of head,” “brain fatigue” or “fear.” Under “loss of head,” for instance, it is pointed out that the pupil in his new occupation of flying, especially for the first time, has every mental faculty on the alert at extremely high tension, and that the sense of danger, although not asserting itself, is also subconsciously present. It follows, therefore, that under the strain of an emergency the power of synchronized decision and act may lapse--this lapse resulting in what is known as “loss of head.” When there is added to this the fact that in flying, not only seconds, but parts of a second count enormously, it will be clear that after an actual loss of head there is seldom time to correct an error.