This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. By information filed in the police court of the District of Columbia, the petitioner was charged with engaging 'in the business of a gift enterprise,' in violation of § 1177 of the Revised Statutes relatin to the District of Columbia. Thereupon an agreed statement of facts was filed, by which it appeared that the petitioner, as the managing officer of the Sperry & Hutchinson Company, was conducting, within the District, its business of issuing and redeeming so-called 'trading stamps' in the particular manner set forth. It was stipulated that the statement should be considered as a part of the information, and the petitioner made a motion to quash. This motion was sustained and the petitioner was discharged. On writ of error, the court of appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the judgment of the police court, and ordered the cause to be remanded for further proceedings in conformity with its opinion. Aplication was made to this court for a writ of certiorari, which was refused. 218 U.S. 673, 54 L. ed. 1205, 31 Sup. Ct. 223. The petitioner was then arraigned in the police court, pleaded not guilty, and waived trial by jury; and the case was submitted to the court upon the agreed statement. Judgment of guilty was entered, and the petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine. He then obtained leave of this court to file the present petition.
The only question before us is whether the police court had jurisdiction. A habeas corpus proceeding cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error, and we are not concerned with the question whether the information was sufficient, or whether the acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say, whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found that the court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judgment. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L. ed. 650; Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 23 L. ed. 787; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 32 L. ed. 274, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1263; Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U.S. 612, 41 L. ed. 572, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182; Re Eckart, 166 U.S. 481, 41 L. ed. 1085, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 138, 46 L. ed. 121, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72; Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U.S. 540, 48 L. ed. 1110.24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 83, 50 L. ed. 90, 97, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 760; Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 136, 50 L. ed. 963, 964, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584; Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146, 148, 53 L. ed. 125, 126, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41, This rule has recently been applied in a case where it was contended in a habeas corpus proceeding that the record should be examined to determine whether there was any testimony to support the accusation. And this court, affirming the judgment which discharged the writ, said by Mr. Justice Day: 'The contention is that, in the respects pointed out, the testimony wholly fails to support the charge. The attack is thus not upon the jurisdiction and authority of the court to proceed to investigate and determine the truth of the charge, but upon the sufficieney of the evidence to show the guilt of the accused. This has never been held to be within the province of a writ of habeas corpus. Upon habeas corpus the court examines only the power and authority of the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions.' Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 448, ante, 47, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47.