"In order to make a proper estimation of virtue, we should take into consideration the motives and inducements a person has to be virtuous. The virtue of some men seems to be predicated on the following principles; on the consideration that they are going to heaven and happiness in another world, while others, whom they conceive not so good as themselves are going to hell, a place of never ending torments. On this ground they can be very _pious_ also, and do a great deal for religion. At the same time they will tell you, as many have, if they believed all were to be alike happy in another world, they would then stick at no crimes to obtain their object, but would indulge themselves in all manner of gratifications, &c. Such virtue, however, I conclude does not stand very high in your estimation. No; but you would be virtuous on a more noble scale; so long as you can believe that you shall have an eternal existence with God, in a happy conscious identity, you are willing every body else should enjoy the same blessing; on supposition that this is true, or as you can believe it, you are for doing all the good in your power, and at the same time taking all the comfort you can in doing it. You are trying to make every one believe what you believe, that they may enjoy what you enjoy. But the moment this faith, and this hope of yours is gone, your virtue is gone with it; you can now do nothing, and of course enjoy nothing!
"Now compare this virtue with the virtue of one whom the christian world would call an infidel! One whose faith, and of course, hope, does not extend beyond what he knows has been the lot of some, and, as far as circumstances will admit, may be his own; and yet he is always faithful in the discharge of whatever appears to be his duty, always enjoys life, whether in prosperity or adversity, and is always, so far as it respects circumstances over which he has no control, reconciled and contented with his lot. He knows his life is uncertain, and although he has no real faith or well grounded hope beyond the present state of existence, yet the thought gives him neither anxiety nor concern. His only object is to do good; to enjoy life while it lasts, to cultivate and improve human nature for the benefit of posterity; to bear the evils and misfortunes of life with fortitude, and to be unfeignedly thankful for all the happiness of which he is made susceptible. Therefore whether his life be for a day, or for eternity, it matters not, because, for the present, it is all the same to him: his duties are the same, and his enjoyments are the same. O how happy! How inexpressibly happy, is such a state as this!