The rule is, however, only a general guide, and does not obviate the necessity of inquiring in each case what are the natural or contemplated damages. In an action by the proprietor of a theatre, it was alleged that the defendant had written a libel on one of the plaintiff's singers, whereby she was deterred from appearing on the stage, and the plaintiff lost his profits; such loss was held to be too remote to be the ground of an action for damages. In _Smeed_ v. _Foord_ (1 Ellis and Ellis, 602), the defendant contracted to deliver a threshing-machine to the plaintiff, a farmer, knowing that it was needed to thresh the wheat in the field. Damages were sought for injury done to the wheat by rain in consequence of the machine not having been delivered in time, and also for a fall in the market before the grain could be got ready. It was held that the first claim was good, as the injury might have been anticipated, but that the second was bad. When, through the negligence of a railway company in delivering bales of cotton, the plaintiffs, having no cotton to work with, were obliged to keep their workmen unemployed, it was held that the wages paid and the profits lost were too remote for damages. On the other hand, where the defendant failed to keep funds on hand to meet the drafts of the plaintiff, so that a draft was returned dishonoured, and his business in consequence was for a time suspended and injured, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover damage for such loss.
The rule that the contract furnishes the measure of the damages does not prevail in the case of unconscionable, i.e. unreasonable, absurd or impossible contracts. The old school-book juggle in geometrical progression has more than once been before the courts as the ground of an action. Thus, when a man agreed to pay for a horse a barley-corn per nail, doubling it every nail, and the amount calculated as 32 nails was 500 quarters of barley, the judge directed the jury to disregard the contract, and give as damages the value of the horse. And when a defendant had agreed for £5 to give the plaintiff two grains of rye on Monday, four on the next Monday,[2] and so on doubling it every Monday, it was contended that the contract was impossible, as all the rye in the world would not suffice for it; but one of the judges said that, though foolish, it would hold in law, and the defendant ought to pay something for his folly. And when a man had promised £1000 to the plaintiff if he should find his owl, the jury were directed to mitigate the damages.