[16] C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH).

[17] Maj J. F. Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict: Policy, Planning, Direction_. MS at OCMH. See also: Capt M. Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” _Army_, vii, no. 4 (Nov 56), 38–44, 65.

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) — Part 12

JSPOG, headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, rapidly fitted an earlier staff study into the framework of CinCUNC’s directive. And the following day, 27 September, a proposed Operation Plan (OpnPlan) 9-50 was laid before the commander in chief.[18] This detailed scheme of action evolved from two basic assumptions: (1) that the bulk of the NKPA had already been destroyed; and (2) that neither the USSR nor Red China would intervene, covertly or openly.

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) — Part 12

Eighth Army, according to plan, would attack across the 38th Parallel, directing its main effort in the west, along the axis Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang (see Map 1). JSPOG designated the latter city--capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea--as final objective of the first phase. Further, it recommended that EUSAK’s drive begin in mid-October, to be followed within a week by a X Corps amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. After establishing a beachhead, Almond’s force would attack 125 road miles westward through the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor and link up with General Walker’s army, thereby trapping North Korean elements falling back from the south.[19]

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) — Part 12

[19] _Ibid._, and CinCFE _OpnPlan_ 9-50. Copy at OCMH.

JSPOG suggested that both commands should then advance north to the line Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, ranging roughly from 50 to 100 miles below the Manchurian border. Only ROK elements would proceed beyond the restraining line, in keeping with the spirit and letter of the 27 September dispatch from JCS.[20]

Major General Doyle O. Hickey, acting as CinCUNC’s chief of staff during General Almond’s tour in the field, approved the JSPOG draft of 28 September. It thereby became OpnPlan 9-50 officially. MacArthur forwarded a summary to JCS the same day, closing his message with this reassurance:

There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces.[21]