The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows: (1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in Paradise and became subject to a twofold delectation—_delectatio coelestis victrix_ and _delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix_. (2) These two delectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger always defeats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance, is alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other.(688) (4) In each case the _delectatio coelestis_ is either stronger than the _delectatio terrena_, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it is stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes _efficax_ or _irresistibilis_. When it is weaker, the will simply _must_ sin, because the _delectatio coelestis_ is too weak to overcome the _delectatio terrena_. The grace given to a man under such conditions is called by the Jansenists _gratia parva sive sufficiens_. When the two delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself unable to come to a definite decision.

This false teaching inspired the famous “five propositions” of Jansenius, to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of God’s commandments for want of grace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is sufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian heresy consisted in assuming the existence of a grace which man may either obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the predestined.

Grace, Actual and Habitual — Part 108

These propositions were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X in his dogmatic Bull “_Cum occasione_,” of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly contained in the second, _viz._: In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace. “If it is true that fallen man never resists interior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who violates a commandment of God has not had the grace to observe it, that he therefore transgressed it through inability to fulfil it (first proposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is clear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite condition of demerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative, merit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the just whenever they fall, it is wanting still more to sinners; it is therefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured to every man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a further consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the universal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth proposition).”(689)

Grace, Actual and Habitual — Part 108