And lo! we have been syllogizing all these years, alike when we listen to the nocturnal yowl of the tomcat, and to the morning song of the lark; alike, when we smell the rose, seize the orange, or devour the tempting oyster. In syllogism do we live and move, and have our being. This is the grand discovery--the last great contribution to philosophy from Concord's greatest philosopher. We suddenly discover that we have been syllogizing like philosophers, as Mrs. Malaprop discovered that her children had been speaking English. The illustration of this overwhelming discovery is peculiarly happy, for he applies it to the discovery of a red flannel rag in the back yard or garden, and, after detecting the red flannel by syllogism, he advances to the grander problem of showing how, by philosophic methods, we can actually distinguish an old tin can from an elephant. To enjoy this fully, the reader must take it himself from the reported lecture.
"The act of recognition is an unconscious syllogistic process in the second figure of the syllogism. I perceive something scarlet in the garden. So far I recognize a host of attributes; it is a real object; the place, surroundings and color are recognized. The sensations were so familiar that the recognition was inconceivably rapid. Then comes a slower process. The scarlet is an attribute. What can the object be? I think it is a piece of red flannel. The inference comes almost to the surface of consciousness, but I have reasoned unconsciously: This object is red. A piece of flannel is red; therefore this may be a piece of red flannel. The middle term is predicate in both premises. The unknown object is red. A familiar object (flannel) is red. Hence, I recognize this as flannel. I identify the unknown object with what is familiar in my mind. But the logician will say that this reasoning is on the invalid mode of the second figure, from which you can never draw an affirmative conclusion. Precisely so, if you mean a necessary conclusion. But sense-perception uses affirmative modes of the second figure and derives probable knowledge therefrom. I make probable knowledge more certain by verifying the inference or correcting it. I go to the garden and pick up the object, and see the threads and fiber of the wool. Or perhaps I find it was a piece of red paper. But whatever it was, at the end I can say what I have seen, only in so far as I have recognized or identified it. Recognition proceeds by the second figure, and has chiefly the non-valid modes. But it may use the valid modes, though in a still less conscious manner. For instance, I recognized that the object was not an elephant by this valid form; every elephant is larger than a tin can; this object is not larger than a tin can; therefore, this object is necessarily not an elephant; or, by this other valid form, no elephant is as small as a tomato can; this object is just the size of a tomato can; hence this object is not an elephant. Had some one told me to look out and see an elephant, my perception would unconsciously have taken one of these forms. The scarlet is recognized as such only as it is identified with a previous impression of scarlet. Here is our third surprise in psychology. Unless there were a priori idea, sense-perception could never begin. More, unless there were a priori idea, it could not begin. For there must be two recognitions before there can be a first new idea from sense-perception. The fourth surprise is that directly with the first activity of perception in the second figure of the syllogism is joined a second activity which takes place in the form of the first figure of the syllogism. As soon as I perceived the red object to be a piece of flannel, I at once reinforced my sense-perception by unlocking all my previous store of knowledge stored up under the category of red flannel. I unconsciously syllogized thus: 'All red flannel has threads of warp and woof and a rough texture, caused by the coarse fibres of wool curling up stiffly; this is a piece of red flannel; hence this will be found to have these properties.' The act of recognition is a subsumption of the object under a class by use of the second figure of the syllogism.