The first point to be considered relates to the jurisdiction of this court. In behalf of the defendant in error it is insisted that it does not appear from the record that the decision of the supreme court of Illinois was adverse to any asserted right under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, nor that the judgment or decree complained of could not have been passed without the determination of any such federal question. Dugger v. Bocock, 104 U.S. 603; Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590. This proposition depends upon the inquiry whether the opinion of the state court, which is made part of the transcript, can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the grounds upon which that court based its final decree.
In Gibson v. Chouteau, 8 Wall. 317; Rector v. Ashley, 6 Wall. 142; and Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, it was ruled that the opinion of the state court constituted no part of the record, for the purpose of determining whether this court will re-examine the final judgment or decree. And in Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 38,-where the question arose as to the effect to be given to the certificate of the chief justice of the state court, showing that a federal question was raised and decided adversely to the party who brought the case here for review,-it was said: 'If this court should entertain jurisdiction upon a certificate alone, in the absence of any evidence of the question in the record, then the supreme court of the state can give the jurisdiction in every case where the question is made by counsel in argument.' To the same effect are Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149, and Railroad v. Rock, 4 Wall. 180. But in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 633, the subject was again under consideration, by reason of the omission from the act of 1867 of that provision in the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789 which restricted this court, when reviewing the final judgment or decree of the highest court of a state, to the consideration of such errors as appeared 'on the face of the record.' It was there said that, in determining whether a federal question was raised and decided in the state court, 'this court has been inclined to restrict its inquires too much by this express limitation of the inquiry 'to the face of the record." 'What was the record of a case,' the court observed, speaking by Mr. Justice MILLER, 'was pretty well understood as a common-law phrase at the time that statute was enacted. But the statutes of the states, and new modes of proceedings in those courts, have changed and confused the matter very much since that time. It is in reference to one of the necessities thus brought about that this court long since determined to consider as part of the record the opinions delivered in such cases by the supreme court of Louisiana. Grand Gulf R. Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165; Cousin v. Blanc's Ex'r, 19 How. 202. And, though we have repeatedly decided that the opinions of other state courts cannot be looked into to ascertain what was decided, wes see no reason why, since this restriction is removed, we should not so far examine those opinions, when properly authenticated, as may be useful in determining that question. We have been in the habit of receiving the certificate of the court, signed by its chief justice or presiding JUDGE, ON THAT POINT, THOUGH NOT AS CONClusive, and these opinions are quite as satisfactory, and may more properly be treated us part of the record than such certificates.' The opinion of the state court in the present case is properly authenticated, and there is, in addition, the certificate of its chief justice, showing that the present plaintiff in error not only claimed that the deed of trust by the National Life Insurance Company gave, when executed, a lien superior to that asserted by the United States Mortgage Company under Lombard's mortgage, but that the act of the legislature of Illinois, in force July 1, 1875, in so far as it attempted to validate mortgages such as the one taken by that company from Lombard, was in conflict, as well with the contract clause of the constitution of the United States as with that part of the fourteenth amendment which prohibits a state from depriving a person of property without due process of law; further, that the latter claim was decided adversely to plaintiff in error.