This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court, constituted as required by statute, dismissing the petition of the appellants to set aside, in part, two orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which were made on November 4, 1929, and July 30, 1929, respectively.

The first-mentioned order was made in a proceeding instituted by the Commission in December, 1925, on its own motion, for an investigation concerning the use of private passenger train cars, including so-called office cars. A questionnaire was sent to all class I and class II carriers, and to switching and terminal carriers, calling for information 'as to private passenger-train cars owned, leased, or operated, the movement or use of such cars as were transported free or at less than tariff rates on home and foreign lines, and the occupants of such cars on respective trips.' Returns were made by 387 carriers covering the calendar years 1923, 1924, and 1925. In July, 1928, a proposed report was served upon appellants and all other carriers. Exceptions were filed by the association of Railway Executives on behalf of its members, including the appellants; argument was heard; and the matter submitted to the Commission. Its report was issued on June 21, 1929, setting forth the Commission's findings and conclusions. 155 I. C. C. 775. After waiver by the carriers of further hearing before the Commission, the order in question was entered requiring the carriers named, including these appellants, 'to cease and desist, on or before January 15, 1930, and thereafter to abstain, from the transportation or movement of private passenger train cars, including so-called office cars, of another carrier free or at other than published tariff rates.'

Louisville Company v. United States (282 U.S. 740)/Opinion of the Court

The other order of the Commission under attack, that is, the order of July 30, 1929, amended the Commission's regulations governing the form and recording of passes, by the insertion of the following: 'A car pass may be issued only for cars owned by the issuing carrier or held by it under lease for use in its business as a common carrier. It may not be issued for other cars. This provision is not to be construed as prohibiting the issuance of passes for cars of lines operated as a part of the same system. See In the Matter of Private Passenger Train Cars, 155 I. C. C. 775.'

Louisville Company v. United States (282 U.S. 740)/Opinion of the Court

The case was tried in the District Court on the facts detailed in the report of the Commission as to the practices of the carriers, ad a § to these facts were was no dispute. The Court concluded that the practice condemned by the Commission was a matter within its jurisdiction, and that, the order being supported by substantial evidence, the Court was without power to interfere.

Louisville Company v. United States (282 U.S. 740)/Opinion of the Court

The evidence before the Commission consisted of the returns of the carriers to its questionnaire. These returns contained a vast amount of statistical data, differing in details but practically the same in substance, which were reviewed and tabulated in the Commission's report. The commission found, in substance, that carriers transported free of charge the private, or office, cars of other carriers when occupied by persons for whose transportation it was lawful to issue a pass; that carriers also provided accessorial transportation of such cars free of charge when they were moved 'deadhead' to stations where they were to be occupied, or to their home stations after occupancy, and also in switching and storing the cars. The wide extent of the practice and the abuses attending it were shown. The Commission referred to the proposal of the carriers to undertake the correction of such abuses, and stated that the Commission was concerned primarily with the legality of the free transportation of the private cars of other carriers.

With respect to the transportation of privately owned cars, that is, of cars owned by others than carriers, or of cars chartered for the exclusive use of special parties, the Commission found that such cars were transported in passenger trains under tariffs which provided for certain minimum revenues, and that these charges were intended to cover the service of transporting the cars; that is, 'to compensate for the movement of the car rather than its contents.' The Commission concluded that the transportation of the private cars of other carriers free, or at less than published rates, while making charges for the movement of privately owned or chartered cars, was injustly discriminatory.