Our expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some little aids of money have been received after long solicitation, hardly so much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose that no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion. Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from her, even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expensive operations on hand; and, till she has allied herself to us, we have no certainty that she will choose to continue the war for the attainment of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled to sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war.
To France, then, we turn, as the only enemy of Great Britain, who is at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for us, in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves, that she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. Her fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our battles; she has made various efforts to restore our finances, by paying the interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our account for clothing, arms, and necessaries; by advancing money, and by opening and guaranteeing a loan for us, to a considerable amount in Holland, when, by the abolition of paper, our finances were totally deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign is about to be opened. France assures, that it is not in her power to make us any further grants of money, her ministers repeat this to us in every letter, in a tone that persuades us of their determination on that point.
What then is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes, which the present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of an active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive system we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak defensive war with an unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend upon what can be torn by violence from the industrious husbandman? Shall we vainly, and I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers of Europe for those means, which we have in our own hands, if we dare call them forth, and which, after all, must be called forth if we continue the war, (and upon that subject there can be no doubt, till the end for which we took up arms is attained.) The only question is, whether each State shall fairly and regularly contribute its quota, or whether that which happens to be the seat of war shall (as has too often been the case) bear the whole burden, and suffer more from the necessities of our own troops, than the ravages of the enemy. Whether we shall drive the enemy from their posts with a strong body of regular troops, or whether we shall permit them to extend their devastations, while, with our battalions and fluctuating corps of militia, we protract a weak defensive war, till our allies are discouraged, and some unfavorable change takes place in the system of Europe.